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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In March, 2001 the first Flint River Drought Protection Act Auction was conducted.  This 
iterative sealed offer auction was held at eight sites in the Flint River Basin.  Several hundred 
farmers participated, and a total of 33,006 acres were taken out of irrigation at an average cost of 
$136 per acre.  This report describes some factors that led us to consider alternative auction 
institutions, the results of laboratory experiments that explore different auction rules, and the 
eventual outcome of the 2002 Irrigation Auction. 
 
Our initial experiments explored the impact of the farmers’ experience in the 2001 Irrigation 
Auction would have on the performance of an auction conducted in subsequent years.  We found 
that the increase in prices and acres accepted in the final round of the 2001 auction was likely to 
result in a significant increase in offers in a future auction conducted with similar rules.  Two 
iterative auctions, however, resulted in prices at about the level of the initial auction.  An auction 
that replicated the rules of the 2001 Irrigation Auction, but with the final offer submission round 
announced in advance, and an iterative auction in which only rejected offers could be revised. 
 
Despite the promise of these two auction institutions, our belief that a constraint on the 
maximum average price paid in the auction would be binding, combined with the high 
implementation costs of an iterative auction, led us to explore the possibility of conducting a 
one-shot auction. 
 
As we suspected, a simple one-shot sealed offer auction resulted in offers far in excess of the 
opportunity cost of the land.  This was true regardless of whether the involuntary takings 
provisions of the Flint River Drought Protection Act were implemented in the auction.  In 
contrast, a posted price auction performed well: all participants with a value less than the posted 
price offered to sell, and those with higher values retained their vouchers.  Average prices in this 
auction were almost identical to those obtained in a sealed offer auction that allowed rejected 
offers to be revised. 
 
We were initially skeptical that any additional benefits would be obtained by using a hybrid of 
the sealed offer and posted price auctions: a sealed offer auction with announced reservation 
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price.  We suspected that the announced reservation price would be an obvious focal point for 
offers, and that most offers would be at or slightly below this level.  However, subsequent 
laboratory experiments and the offers submitted in the 2002 Irrigation Auction contradicted our 
intuition. 
 
Very few offers were made at the reservation price, and many offers were significantly below it.  
In the 2002 Auction, offers ranged from $74 to $150 per acre, and offers were received covering 
more than 50,000 acres.  For small numbers of acres (less than 30,000) the average offer price 
was about equal to that received in 2001.  However, for larger numbers of acres, the average 
offer was substantially lower in the 2002 Irrigation Auction.  Our experiments indicate that this 
was the result of the auction institution, and not due to the threat of involuntary taking. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2001, the first Flint River Drought Protection Act auction was conducted.  This auction 
was conducted as an iterative sealed-offer auction.  Farmers submitted offers (a per-acre price at 
which they were willing to suspend irrigation under a given permit for the remainder of the 
calendar year), which were ranked from lowest to highest-priced offer.  A cutoff price was 
determined, and “provisional winners” were announced.  No information was given about the 
magnitude of provisionally accepted or rejected offers.  All farmers (whether provisional winners 
or losers) were then free to submit a revised offer.  This process continued until no revised offers 
were submitted, or the EPD officials supervising the auction chose to end it. 
 
Several hundred farmers participated in this auction, and a total of 33,006 acres were taken out of 
irrigation at an average cost of about $136 per acre.  Despite the declared successful outcome of 
this auction, two considerations led us to question the efficacy of repeating the procedures used 
in the 2001 Irrigation Auction. 
 
In the final round of the 2001 Irrigation Auction, about twice as many offers were accepted as in 
any of the preliminary offer submission rounds.  The maximum accepted offer increased from 
$125 per acre in the fourth round to $200 per acre in the fifth (final) round.  We were concerned 
that if the same auction process was used, farmers would come into the auction with the 
expectation that relatively high offers would be accepted in the final round, and that they would 
therefore resist competitive pressures to decrease their offer prices.  This could result in a much 
longer auction than was the case last year (in an effort to drive down offers through repeated 
offer-submission rounds) or retiring fewer acres from irrigation given the EPD’s budget 
constraint. 
 
The second consideration was the result of laboratory experiments that we conducted.  In an 
environment where collusion was possible1 our experiments showed that the ratio of offers to 
                                                 
1 We observed efforts to share information and collude during the 2001 irrigation auction.  Farmers brought cellular 
phones to the auction sites, and called friends and relatives at other sites in an effort to learn the maximum accepted 
offer price in each round.  Other farmers made explicit efforts at collusion, encouraging others to submit offers at 
some fixed price. 
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value decreased over submission rounds; however, average offers were almost always 20 percent 
above the average value to participants.  Moreover, the average price of provisionally accepted 
offers typically decreased for two or three rounds, but thereafter it tended to increase.  We 
believe this was because participants gained information about the maximum accepted price in 
previous rounds, and those with provisionally accepted offers increased their offers.  All of this 
raises the question of when (after how many rounds) the auction should end. 
 
These concerns, combined with subsequent research (described in Section 2 below), caused us to 
dismiss the iterative discriminative auction that was used in 2001.  Instead, we turned our 
attention away from discriminative auctions (where each farmer receives an amount equal to his 
or her own offer) to uniform price auctions (where each farmer receives the same price, 
regardless of the amount any given farmer actually offered).  More specifically, we focused on 
the posted price auction:  a price is specified at which the buyer is willing to purchase; sellers can 
either agree to offer at that price, or refuse.  Any transactions that occur take place at this posted 
price. 
 
Before conducting any experiments, we saw two advantages of the posted price auction.  Our 
experience last year demonstrated the obvious incentive in a discriminative sealed offer auction 
for sellers to make offers at prices significantly above value.  We expected this to be even more 
important in a one-shot auction without revisions (where competitive pressures to lower offers 
are muted), and after the observation that some farmers received up to $200 an acre last year.  
Second, the possibility that the “involuntary taking” provision of the law would be implemented 
appeared more likely than last year.  None of our previous research specifically addressed the 
question of how the possibility of a taking would affect incentives in either the discriminative-
price sealed offer auction or in a uniform posted price auction. 
 
We conducted experiments that compared the one-shot sealed offer auction with a posted price 
auction.  We used identical values between sessions, and all experiments were held in an 
environment conducive to communication and collusion.  We explained the involuntary takings 
provision to these subjects, and a taking did, in fact, occur. 
 
 6
The following section describes our initial experiments that focused on replicating the 2001 
Irrigation Auction experience, and studying its effect on subsequent auctions.  The third section 
lays out the experimental design for follow-up experiments that focused on the sealed bid and 
posted price auction mechanisms.  Section 4 presents results from the 2002 Irrigation auction, 
and the final section summarizes our research and offers conclusions. 
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2.  INITIAL EXPERIMENTS: REPLICATING THE 2001 AUCTION EXPERIENCE 
 
Our initial interest was in replicating the 2001 Irrigation Auction, and determining the effect it 
would have on a subsequent auction using the same (or similar) rules.  In order to accomplish 
this, subjects participated in two back-to-back auctions during the same session.  The first 
implemented the rules of the 2001 Irrigation auction and the second either replicated this auction 
or was a modification of the original procedures.  Below, we describe how these auctions were 
implemented in the lab, and the results that we obtained from our experiments. 
 
Replicating the 2001 Irrigation Auction 
At the start of the experiment subjects were given two “vouchers” with a redemption value 
written on the front.  Each voucher could be either kept or sold.  If kept, the subject received the 
redemption value written on the voucher.  If sold, the subject received the offer price at which he 
or she offered to sell the voucher.  (The voucher corresponds to an auction certificate that covers 
one acre of land.)  Appendix A1.1 contains instructions for this treatment.  The vouchers ranged 
in value from $3 to $8; while voucher values differed between participants, the two vouchers 
held by any one participant had similar values (typically the same value or within $1).  Appendix 
A2.1 contains the values used in all of our sessions.2 
 
Subjects submitted offers to sell the voucher, which were ranked in price from low to high.  
Provisional winners (those subjects who submitted offers at a price equal to or below our 
predetermined maximum) were announced, and subjects were allowed to revise offers.  An 
important feature of this auction mechanism is that all participants (provisional winners and 
losers) were allowed to revise their offers.  Therefore a participant whose offer was initially 
rejected could lower the offer, while a participant who submitted a low offer that was 
provisionally accepted could increase the offer.  If accepted this would increase the earnings of 
the participant, but this comes at the risk of being left out of the final accepted vouchers.  This 
replicates the incentives in the 2001 Irrigation Auction. 
 
                                                 
2 In pilot experiments (conducted in summer, 2001), an individual participant might have held vouchers with very 
low and very high values.  Upon reflection, more homogeneous values for a single participant seemed a more 
reasonable representation of the value of irrigation to a farmer. 
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In the first three offer rounds, all offers at or below $8 were provisionally accepted.  This 
maximum price was not announced – only the voucher numbers associated with provisionally 
accepted offers.  In Round 4, all offers below $8 were provisionally accepted, but only half of 
those at $8.  After announcing the provisional winners from Round 4, we made the following 
(verbal) announcement:  “Some of you may notice that when you offered both of your vouchers 
for $8, one was accepted and the other was not accepted.  This is because of the rule explained to 
you concerning ties.  With more than one voucher offered at the maximum price we are 
accepting in a round, the winners are chosen randomly when we are unable to buy all vouchers 
offered at that price.”  In Round 5, however, we accepted all offers at or below $12. 
 
This replicated the experience farmers had in the 2001 Irrigation Auction in several respects.  
During this auction the maximum accepted offer was roughly constant in the first three offer 
rounds ($130 in Round 1 and $127 in Rounds 2 and 3).  In Round 4, all offers below $125 per 
acre were accepted, but only some at this price.  At several auction sites, there were farmers who 
had submitted more than one offer at $125/acre, but had only some of these offers accepted.  The 
tie-breaking rule had to be publicly explained, so we believe that many farmers knew the 
maximum accepted per-acre price in Round 4.  In the final round, the maximum accepted offer 
($200) was about 50-percent higher than in the preceding offer submission rounds. 
 
Implementing an Auction without Provisional Winners 
In some sessions, the second auction was a slightly modified version of the iterative auction 
described above.  All procedures remained unchanged, except that any acceptances were final 
and could not be revised in subsequent offer rounds.  Subjects were told that we would accept at 
most three offers in each round, and that accepted offers could not be revised.  They were also 
told that we had a maximum price that we could pay for vouchers, but we did not announce this 
price.  This maximum price was set at $8 for comparability with the first auction.  Subjects also 
were not told the number of offer rounds that would be conducted.  Appendix A1.2 contains 
instructions from this auction treatment. 
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Replicating the Farmers’ Experience 
The experimental sessions were organized to replicate the experience that farmers participating 
in a new auction would have encountered.  All sessions were held in an open area outside of the 
experimental laboratory.  Chairs were arranged in a circle, and there was no prohibition on 
subjects talking to one another about the auction or anything else.  In addition, we had no 
restrictions on friends or family members participating together.  In fact, subjects often informed 
one another about the opportunity to participate in an experiment, and it was not unusual for 
several friends to sign up together to participate.  While this is unusual in economics 
experiments, we believed this to be a more accurate reflection of an actual auction where farmers 
who know one other participate together. 
 
All experiments started with a trial auction, in order to familiarize subjects with the rules, how 
earnings were calculated, and to give them some idea of the range of offers that might be made 
and considered.  We had some concern about doing this given that most farmers had no 
experience with such an auction prior to the 2001 Irrigation Auction.  However, there were 
several information sessions held, and farmers had ample opportunity prior to the auction to talk 
with one another about bidding strategies and expectations of others’ behavior.3  Our subjects did 
not have these opportunities, and so to reduce “noise” in initial offers we decided to conduct a 
three-round trial auction that had no impact on their earnings. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the sequence of experiments in each of these sessions.  The first experiment in 
each session was a replication of the 2001 Irrigation Auction, described above (and denoted 
“old” in Table 2.1).  The range of accepted offers (maximum, minimum, and average accepted 
offer), and number of accepted offers, was publicly announced in order to provide subjects with 
similar information to that provided to the public in a press release after the 2001 Irrigation 
Auction. 
 
In some sessions the second experiment was a replication of this; however, the maximum 
accepted price was $8 in all rounds, and the tie rule was not imposed in the penultimate round.  
                                                 
3 In fact, at the auction site that Laury supervised in 2001 (Webster County), many participants were heard 
discussing just such factors during the registration period the day before the auction. 
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In the remaining sessions, the second experiment was an iterative auction with no provisional 
winners (all acceptances were final, denoted “new” in Table 2.1).  In one of these sessions 
(September 24), the lowest three offers were accepted, regardless of the price.  In two other 
sessions (October 3 and October 8), three offers were accepted in each round, subject to a 
maximum price of $8.  In one session, the price constraint of $8 was imposed on the maximum 
average accepted price (including acceptances in all offer rounds).  We tested this constraint 
because of our belief that the EPD’s decision of which offers to accept (in the event of a new 
irrigation auction in 2002) could be driven by a maximum average price rather than a simple 
maximum price constraint. 
  
After the first three sessions, we became concerned that subjects were not fully aware of the 
change in decision rules between the fourth and fifth rounds of the first experiment, and did not 
discuss their experiences with one another sufficiently.  Therefore, all remaining sessions 
included announcements made by the experimenter (“with announcements” in Table 2.1).  The 
text that was read for these announcements is contained in Appendix A1.3.  These 
announcements encouraged subjects to talk about their experiences in the prior auctions (the trial 
auction or initial auction for payment).  After the replication of the 2001 Irrigation Auction their 
attention was called to the fact that “many more offers were accepted (and at higher prices) in the 
final round than were provisionally accepted in any earlier round of the auction.”  Further, they 
were encouraged to think about and discuss the information we provided them about accepted 
offers in the initial auction. 
 
Results from Initial Experiments 
We evaluate the performance of the auction mechanisms shown in Table 2.1 by comparing the 
average cost of obtaining a specified numbers of vouchers in the auction.  In each session we 
conducted, the first auction utilized the 2001 procedures (sealed offer with revisions).  In each 
figure (for example, see Figure 2.1) we show what the average cost would be (given the offers 
submitted in the auction) of obtaining the number of vouchers shown on the horizontal axis.  The 
thick black line in each of the following figures shows the average cost of obtaining the vouchers 
over all nine (2001 replication) auctions that were conducted first in each of these sessions.  
Identical procedures were used in all nine auctions, and so we present these data in this 
 11
aggregated format.  More vouchers were offered in some auctions than others (either because 
there were different numbers of participants – ranging from 12 to 15 – or because participants 
with high values dropped out of some auctions).  Therefore, this line is not smooth for more than 
20 vouchers because there are fewer observations in this range. 
 
We are interested in seeing how their experience in the first auction (a dramatic increase in the 
maximum accepted price and number of vouchers purchased) affects performance of any 
subsequent auction (using old or new procedures).  We will also compare the performance of 
each of these auction mechanisms when preceded by what we call the “2001 experience.”  As in 
Table 2.1, the “old” auction refers to the sealed offer auction with revisions, and the “new” 
auction refers to a sealed offer auction where (up to) three vouchers are purchased in each round 
and accepted offers cannot be revised. 
 
Recall that our first sessions did not use announcements that invited subjects to talk and called 
specific attention to their experience in the first auction.  Even without such announcements, 
average prices were higher in a second auction conducted using the same procedures.  Figure 2.1 
shows the average cost in a second auction using the same rules (thin blue line) is higher for 
almost any number of vouchers offered in this auction.  As shown in Figure 2.2, the new 
procedures result in even higher prices (red line), unless a maximum price constraint is imposed 
(orange line).  In fact, when this constraint is imposed, the average cost using the new procedures 
is lower than in the initial auction (see Figure 2.3), despite the increase in prices they 
experienced in the first auction in the session. 
 
As noted earlier, we were concerned that subjects weren’t fully aware of the increase in prices 
and acres that occurred in the last round of the first auction.  As shown in Figure 2.4, making 
these announcements caused a dramatic increase in offers under both the old and new 
mechanisms.  However, Figure 2.5 shows that the new auction with a maximum price constraint 
performs as well as the initial auction, even after the announcements (at least when about half or 
more of the vouchers are obtained). 
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With announcements, there is little difference in the performance of these auction mechanisms if 
only a few vouchers are purchased.  Differences occur when more than about 25 percent of 
available vouchers are purchased.  The new auction mechanism with a maximum price constraint 
does better than the old mechanism (see Figure 2.6).  If a maximum average price constraint is 
used, prices are even lower; because this is a more strict constraint, however, prices could not be 
higher using this decision rule. 
 
In one session using the old auction procedures (shown in Figure 2.6), we explored the effect of 
announcing the final offer submission round just before it occurred.  This results in prices about 
equal to those observed using the new mechanism (with no provisional winners), and even lower 
if the majority of vouchers are obtained.  We speculate that bidders’ risk aversion may drive 
down offer prices if participants know that they will not have another chance to revise the offer 
price. 
 
Although offer prices were almost uniformly higher in the second auction conducted in each 
session, we wanted to be sure that this was because of the increase in prices and acres that 
occurred in the first auction and not simply the result of experience.  In order to address this, we 
conducted one session where the initial auction used a maximum price of $8 in all rounds.  
Figure 2.7 compares two auctions using the old procedures: one was preceded by the 2001 
experience (blue line) and the other was preceded by an auction with a fixed maximum price (red 
line).  The effect is strong: the average cost of obtaining any number of vouchers is much higher 
following the 2001 experience.  Without this experience, the cost of obtaining vouchers is almost 
identical to that in the first auction (even lower for the first few vouchers, as shown in Figure 
2.8).  However, fewer vouchers are offered in the second auction – only about 2/3 of the total 
number available in the auction.  Those with higher values apparently learned in the first auction 
that it was unlikely their offers would be accepted and so they dropped out of the second auction 
after being excluded in the first two rounds. 
 
Conclusions 
While a discriminative auction where some vouchers are accepted each round (subject to a price 
constraint) showed promise, two factors pulled us away from any of these auctions.  First, we felt 
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that implementing the involuntary takings provision of the Flint River Drought Protection Act 
was increasingly likely.  Second, the state had just over $5 million remaining from the 2001 
auction, and having the $4.5 million spent in 2001 replenished was uncertain due to the 
economic climate in the state.  If the state were to attempt to take more acreage out of irrigation 
in 2002 than the previous year, then it was quite likely that a maximum average price constraint 
would drive the auction.  For example, if the state wanted to take 50,000 acres out of irrigation 
and could spend only $5.5 million to do so, this implies that the average price paid in the auction 
cannot exceed $110/acre. 
 
The choice of institution may yield efficiency differences.  However, in this situation the total 
cost to the EPD of obtaining the target acreage would be the same, regardless of the particular 
auction mechanism chosen.4  Therefore, we focused on two other institutions that involved far 
lower implementation costs (both for the farmers and the EPD): a one-shot sealed offer auction 
and a posted price auction. 
 
                                                 
4 To the extent that the choice of auction affects offers, it could also determine the number of acres offered 
voluntarily in the auction and the number that would be taken on an involuntary basis. 
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3.  ONE-SHOT AUCTIONS: SEALED OFFER AND POSTED PRICE 
 
When we turned our attention to these auctions, we recognized that they would be far easier to 
implement, and be more easily understood for the farmer, than the iterative procedures used 
earlier.  The sealed offer auction is quite similar to that used in 2001.  Farmers submit a per-acre 
offer price.  After all have been submitted they are ranked from low to high, and the lowest 
priced offers are accepted.  These acceptances are final – there is no chance to revise a rejected 
(or accepted) offer.  We were, however, concerned that a sealed offer auction without iterations 
would lead to significant over-bidding relative to value, especially after the 2001 auction 
experience.  Because of this concern we also tested a simple posted-price auction: a price is 
posted that specifies how much the EPD is willing to pay to take land out of irrigation.  Farmers 
may then accept this price (in which case they receive this posted price for all acres taken out of 
irrigation) or reject it (in which case they receive nothing).  This is a uniform price auction – all 
farmers are paid the same per-acre price, even those with values substantially below the posted 
price.  However, this avoids the risk (inherent in the discriminative sealed offer auction) that 
farmers with values close to the posted price are left out due overbidding. 
 
The new experimental sessions are listed in Table 3.1.  In this series of experiments, subjects 
participated in a single auction during a session.  Some subjects had participated in one of the 
sessions described above, and others had never participated in an auction experiment.  This 
replicated the mix of participants we expected in an actual auction: some farmers would have 
participated previously, or talked with others who had, while some farmers would be relatively 
inexperienced.  Because subjects participated in only one auction, voucher values were higher 
(ranging from $15 to $23), but the distribution was essentially unchanged from the experiments 
reported above. 
 
Because we were concerned about the possibility of an involuntary taking (and had not 
previously conducted any experiments exploring the effect of it), we implemented these 
provisions in most of the sessions reported in this section.  All posted price sessions included 
involuntary taking (see Appendix A1.4 for the instructions); we conducted the sealed offer 
auction with and without involuntary taking (Appendix A1.5 contains these instructions).  The 
results from these experiments are described below. 
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Results: Sealed Offer and Posted Price Auctions 
The posted price auction is quite transparent: anyone with a value less than the posted price 
should agree to sell at this price, and those with values higher should not offer to sell.  (Those 
with values equal to the posted price are indifferent between selling and not.)  Ideally, in the 
sealed offer auction those with the lowest values will submit the lowest offer prices, but 
differences in expectations, experience, and risk aversion may lead to different results. 
 
We consider three measures of performance for the sealed offer and posted price auctions.  The 
first, which is most relevant to the EPD in choosing between institutions, is the average price 
paid in each auction.  A lower average price translates as a lower total cost of obtaining a fixed 
number of vouchers.  However, as noted above, if an average price constraint is binding a lower 
average price implies more vouchers obtained voluntarily in the auction (and therefore fewer 
vouchers taken on an involuntary basis). 
  
Because the same price is paid for all units in a posted price auction, the average price is constant 
for all vouchers that are offered in the auction.  Figure 3.1 shows the average price under both 
auctions.  For comparison, the horizontal lines show the number of vouchers offered in a posted 
price auction with two different prices: $18 and $19.40.  In these experiments the posted price 
was actually $18, and the length of the line shows the number of vouchers actually offered in this 
treatment.  Virtually all subjects made offers as expected.  Therefore, we constructed the $19.40 
line, which shows the number of participants that should have made offers (those with values 
less than $19.40) if the price had been $19.40.5 
 
In the sealed offer auction, very few vouchers were offered at a price less than $18.  Therefore, 
the average price in the sealed offer auction is lower only for a very small number of vouchers 
relative to the total number available in the auction.  These experiments suggest that a posted 
price auction would be less expensive if a substantial number of vouchers are desired. 
 
                                                 
5  This will be used for comparison with another auction institution described below. 
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We define the opportunity cost of selling a voucher as the value that voucher.  By comparing the 
total cost of obtaining a specified number of vouchers relative to the total value to the holder of 
these vouchers, we can measure over-bidding in the sealed offer auction.  Notice that this 
measure generally decreases for the posted price auction because the average cost is constant but 
the values tend to increase as more vouchers are offered (see Figure 3.2).  Notice that this ratio is 
quite small for the first few vouchers in the sealed offer auction.  In one of these auctions there 
was some under-bidding relative to value (this could be the result of confusion or due to the 
involuntary takings provision).  However, overbidding increases as more vouchers are offered, 
and offers are quite high (more than 20 percent over value) when a large number of vouchers are 
offered. 
  
Finally, we can measure the efficiency of the auction (whether we obtained the lowest valued 
vouchers from the standpoint of those holding them) by tracking the cost of obtaining vouchers 
relative to the minimum opportunity cost.  This is shown in Figure 3.3.  The posted price auction 
is far more efficient: those vouchers with the lowest values are more often offered in this auction 
format. 
 
We also examined the effect of involuntary taking in the sealed offer auction.  The possibility of 
involuntary taking should not affect these choices in a posted price auction: if a voucher is taken 
the subject simply receives the posted price.  Therefore, those with higher values cannot gain by 
offering to sell at the posted price.  For this reason, we did not conduct additional experiments 
using a posted price auction without involuntary taking. 
 
A priori, the effect of involuntary taking in the sealed offer auction was not as clear.  Because 
those with taken vouchers receive the average price paid out in the voluntary auction, 
participants must consider the perceived likelihood that that his or her voucher will be taken and 
the expected average price.  Someone with a high value who believes it likely that their voucher 
will be taken might offer to sell below value in the hope of selling at a price above the average 
price paid out in the auction.  Alternatively, there may be a strategic reason for increasing offers 
if one believes that this will have a positive impact on the average price paid.  This is particularly 
relevant given that subjects in our experiment had more than one voucher. 
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 Figure 3.4 shows the cost of obtaining vouchers relative to the value of these vouchers in a 
sealed offer auction with and without taking.  (There were more participants in the auction 
without taking, and so more vouchers were offered.)  For almost any number of vouchers 
overbidding is higher in the auction without taking, indicating that subjects bid closer to value, 
on average, when there is a threat of implementing the involuntary takings procedures. 
 
Comparison with Iterative Auction, with Taking 
It is useful to compare an auction that allows those with rejected offers to revise them with our 
one-shot auctions.  The auctions shown in Figure 3.5 each used the same values and 
implemented the involuntary takings provisions.  The auction with revisions was quite similar to 
the “new” procedures described above; however we did not accept a fixed number of vouchers in 
each round.  Instead, we imposed a maximum average price constraint and purchased as many 
vouchers as we could in each round, subject to the constraint that the average cost of vouchers 
purchased (over all rounds) not exceed $18.  By using this average price, we can directly 
compare the performance of this auction with our posted price experiments. 
 
Whether the measure is the average price paid in the auction (Figure 3.5) or efficiency (Figure 
3.6), the posted price and sealed offer auction with revisions have almost identical performance 
properties.  Slightly more vouchers could be obtained voluntarily in the sealed offer with 
revisions, but certainly not enough to justify the additional implementation costs.  The one-shot 
sealed offer auction had substantially higher prices and lower efficiency than either of the other 
auction institutions. 
 
A Sealed Offer Auction with Announced Reservation Price 
When the EPD announced their 2002 auction rules – a one-shot sealed offer auction with 
announced reservation price – we suspected that the reservation price would serve as a focal 
point for offers and therefore would yield few gains over a simple posted price auction.  We then 
conducted a series of experiments to explore whether this was the case. 
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Our experiment instructions were quite close to those used before; we explained the “tie rule”6 
and takings provision using language from the letter the EPD sent to farmers prior to the March, 
2002 Irrigation Auction.  We conducted two sessions that included the possibility of involuntary 
taking and another two sessions that did not mention involuntary taking (instructions are in 
Appendices A1.6 and A1.7, respectively). 
 
Much to our surprise, many participants made offers at prices below the $19.40 reservation price.  
In the auction with taking, about 25 percent of offers were at $19.40, while about 40 percent of 
all offers were at or below $19.00; in the auction without taking, just over 10 percent of offers 
were at $19.40, with almost 70 percent of all offers at or below $19.00. 
 
There was very little difference between average offers or efficiency in the auctions with and 
without taking (Figures 3.7 and 3.8, respectively).  In addition, these auctions performed better 
than the posted price auction using either of these measures. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of these experiments indicate that a one-shot auction can perform as well as the 
iterative auction procedures used in 2001.  Although there is a strong incentive to over-bid, 
relative to value, in a sealed offer auction, announcing the reservation price that is to be used has 
a dramatic effect on offers.  Figure 3.9 shows the average price paid in three one-shot auctions: 
posted price, sealed offer where no reservation price is announced, and sealed offer with an 
announced reservation price.  Unless very few vouchers are obtained, the average price paid is 
much lower in either the posted price auction or the auction with an announced reservation price. 
 
Next, we look at the offers that were made in the 2002 Irrigation Auction. 
 
                                                 
6 This refers to the provision that is implemented if more offers are made at the maximum accepted price than we are 
able to accept. 
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4.  THE 2002 IRRIGATION AUCTION 
 
The 2002 Irrigation Auction implemented a sealed offer auction, with an announced reservation 
price of $150.  This maximum was lower than the maximum accepted price in 2001 ($200 per 
acre); however it was also considerably higher than the average price paid in 2001 ($136 per 
acre).  We had two concerns going into this auction.  First, in 2001 over 7,000 acres were offered 
at prices between $151 and $200 per acre.  We felt that some of these participants might not 
offer to suspend irrigating this year, with a maximum price of $150.  In addition, as stated 
earlier, we believed that the announced reservation price would serve as a focal point for offers.  
If most offers were at this price, only about 35,000 acres could be taken out of irrigation by 
staying within the remaining ($5.5 million) budget. 
 
In 2002, there were more acres (13 percent) and more permits (20 percent) eligible to participate 
than in 2001.  There were an additional 192 permits that were declared eligible for the 2002 
auction that were not included in the 2001 auction.  This increase was offset by 82 permits 
included in the 2001 Irrigation Auction that were subsequently declared ineligible for the 2002 
auction.  Of these 82 permits, more than half (49) were not offered in the 2001 auction.  Of the 
remaining vouchers, 17 were “losers” in 2001 (the offers were not accepted) and 16 were 
“winners.”  In all, a total of $297,033 was paid in the 2001 Irrigation Auction to the winners 
whose certificates were not eligible in 2002. 
 
Below we compare the performance of the 2001 and 2002 irrigation auctions.  We first examine 
only those certificates eligible in both auctions.  Next, we compare the overall performance of 
both auctions. 
 
Certificates Eligible in Both the 2001 and 2002 Irrigation Auctions 
Of the 686 permits eligible for the 2002 Irrigation Auction, 494 (72 percent) were also eligible in 
2001.  We first focus on these 494 permits so that we can directly compare behavior between the 
two auctions. 
 
On average, offers for these permits were lower than in 2001.  Of the 494 permits eligible in both 
auctions, 255 were offered in the 2002 Irrigation auction.  The average offer made by those who 
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participated in both auctions decreased from $186.63 in 2001 to $133.45 in 2002.  Of course, 
offers greater than $150 per acre were prohibited this year; however, it is interesting to note the 
number of permits that were offered this year despite extremely high offer prices on those same 
permits in 2001.  For example, over 30 percent of this year’s offers (80 of 255) were for permits 
with offers greater than $150 in the 2001 auction.  Almost 25 percent (61 of 255) were for 
permits with offers greater than $200 in the 2001 auction. 
 
There were a total of 214 people that made offers in both the 2001 and 2002 Irrigation Auctions.  
Overall, 112 participants (52 percent) decreased their offer price from 2001 to 2002.  This 
decrease in offers ranged from -$862.50 to -$0.05.  Only 19 participants did not change their 
offer price.  The remaining 83 participants increased their offers, from $1 to $70.  Figure 4.1 
shows the distribution of the change in offers between 2001 and 2002.  Not only did more 
participants decrease their offer price than those who increased it, the absolute magnitude of the 
decrease in offer price was larger than the increase in offer price. 
 
This provides us with some initial evidence that the 2002 Irrigation Auction outperformed the 
2001 Auction.  Next we look at all offers in both auctions. 
 
Comparing the 2001 and 2002 Irrigation Auctions: All Offers 
About 13 percent fewer acres were offered in 2002 than in 2001.  However, this was not a 
surprise given the constraint on offer prices this year, and the fact that offers ranged from 1-cent 
to $1,000 per acre in the 2001 Irrigation Auction. 
 
Recall that we were concerned that some of the 2001 winners (who made offers between $151 
and $200 per acre) would not participate in this year’s auction.  Taken as a whole, this did not 
happen.  There were a total of 37 offers between $151 and $200 in the 2001 Irrigation Auction.  
Of these, only 2 permits were not offered in the 2002 auction.  In fact, 23 of these permits were 
winners in the 2002 auction, with offers ranging from $94 to $145 per acre.  The remaining 11 
permits were losers in this year’s auction. 
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Over half of this year’s winners were also winners last year (52 percent), and only about 12 
percent of this year’s winners were losers last year.  This year’s losers were about equally 
divided between winners and losers last year (34 percent and 30 percent respectively; the 
remaining losers were ineligible or chose not to participate in 2001). 
 
The average price paid was lower in 2002 than in 2001 ($127.96 compared with $135.70) and 
more acres were obtained (40,861 versus 33,006).  Figure 4.2 presents what the average cost 
would be of obtaining a specified number of acres in both the 2001 and 2002 auctions.  The 
range of acres represents the total number offered in each auction, and not the number of acres 
actually taken out of irrigation in each year.  When fewer than 30,000 acres are targeted, the 
average price paid in 2001 was somewhat lower than what could be achieved this year.  However 
the difference is small (the maximum difference is $6.35).  After this, the increase in average 
cost in the 2001 auction is dramatic.  For example, to obtain about 40,000 acres (the number 
obtained in the 2002 Irrigation Auction) the average cost would have been $154.44 in the 2001 
auction, compared with $127.55 in this year’s auction.  Figure 4.3 shows the difference in 
average cost between 2001 and 2002; the negative value for the highest number of acres shows 
that the average cost was lower in 2002. 
 
Of those who were eligible in both years, over half (57 percent) of those whose offers were not 
accepted last year did not participate in the 2002 Irrigation Auction.  Because those with the 
highest values did not participate in this year’s auction (due to the upper limit on offers), the 
distribution of 2002 offers is truncated at $150 per acre.  However, using all submitted offers the 
distribution of acres offered below $150 per acre is quite different between the 2001 and 2002 
Irrigation Auctions, as shown in Figure 4.4.  The number of acres offered is quite similar at offer 
prices below $125 an acre (14,053 in 2001 compared with 12,786 in 2002).  However, in 2002 
almost four-times as many acres were offered at prices between $125 and $150 than in 2001 
(11,571 in 2001 compared with 40,123 in 2002). 
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5.  FARMER REACTION TO THE 2002 IRRIGATION AUCTION 
 
In April, 2002, we sent a survey to all farmers who were eligible to participate in the 2002 
irrigation auction.  The goal was to obtain more information about these farmers, and to assess 
their reaction to the new auction procedures.  A separate survey was sent for each eligible permit, 
so farmers with multiple permits received more than one copy of the survey.  Appendix A3.1 
contains copies of the three surveys sent to those with accepted offers, those with rejected offers, 
and those who did not participate in the auction.  Combined, we mailed 686 surveys and received 
responses from 156 of these (a 23 percent response rate).  Of those with accepted offers, we 
received responses from 67 of 276 surveys (24 percent).  Of those with rejected offers, 22 of 70 
surveys replied (31 percent), and for non-participants the response rate was 20 percent (67 of 
340). 
 
Crops Planted in 2001 and 2002 
Most eligible farmers planted on the land covered by their permit in 2001 (see Table 5.1).  The 
table headings in this (and following) tables refers to the farmers’ status in the 2002 auction.  For 
example, the first column shows the percentage of farmers whose 2002 offers were accepted 
actually planted in 2001.  There was little difference in the percentage planting among those with 
accepted offers, rejected offers, and non-participants in the 2002 auction.  Table 5.2 shows the 
distribution of crops planted in 2001.  Among those who planted in 2001, about 75 percent of all 
acreage was in corn, cotton, and peanuts. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the same information, but for the crops planted in 2002.  This table reflects both 
the acreage that had already been planted at the time the survey was conducted and also the 
acreage farmers stated they intended to plant during the 2002 growing season.  As in 2001, about 
75 percent of all acreage was in corn, cotton, and peanuts. There was little difference in the 
planting patterns between those whose offers were accepted and those who chose not to 
participate in the auction.  However, those with rejected offers reported planting no corn 
(compared with 20 percent of the acreage for accepted offers), and almost half of their acreage in 
peanuts (43 percent, compared to 20 percent for those with accepted offers).  Of those farmers 
with accepted offers, 90 percent stated that they intended to plant in 2002 even though they could 
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not irrigate (see Table 5.4).  However, 20 percent of farmers whose offers were not accepted 
stated that they would not have planted if their offers had been accepted in the 2002 irrigation 
auction. 
 
Factors Affecting Offer Prices and the Decision to Participate in the 2002 Irrigation Auction 
About half of those who did not participate (55 percent) stated that they would have participated 
in the 2002 Irrigation Auction if offers above $150 an acre had been considered.  Of those who 
would have offered to suspend irrigation at a higher price, Table 5.5 reports the prices at which 
offers would have been made.  About 38 percent of these non-participants would have made 
offers if the upper-limit had been set between $150 and $175 per acre.  However 23 percent of 
these non-participants would have required a reservation price higher than $300 an acre in order 
to participate in the auction. 
 
Appendix A3.2 shows a transcript of farmers’ comments about their decision to participate in the 
auction (for non-participants) and about considerations in setting an offer price (for those with 
accepted and rejected offers, respectively).  Non-participants were asked what factors (other than 
the upper-limit on offer price) affected their decision not to submit an offer in the auction.  The 
reasons most often listed were crop rotation and insurance eligibility.  Several respondents also 
stated that they did not believe themselves to be eligible to participate.  We asked auction 
participants what factors they considered in setting an offer price.  The most common replies 
were the crops they would plant, yield, crop prices, and the rental value of their land.  In 
addition, those with accepted offers cited as considerations the probability of their offer being 
accepted, uncertainty regarding the farm bill, and even the environmental impact of irrigation. 
 
Comparison of the 2001 and 2002 Irrigation Auctions 
In order to assess farmers’ reaction to the new auction procedures, we specifically asked farmers 
whether they felt the procedures used in 2002 were better or worse than those used in 2001.  The 
results are contained in Table 5.6. Surprisingly, there was little difference between the answers 
provided by those with accepted offers and those with rejected offers.  Of those with accepted 
offers, 86 percent felt the 2002 procedures were an improvement over those used one year 
earlier, compared with 79 percent for those with unaccepted offers and 96 percent of those who 
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did not participate.  Only 10 percent of those with accepted offers felt the procedures were 
worse, compared with 21 percent of those with rejected offers, and none for non-participants.  
(Remaining farmers did not prefer one auction mechanism over the other).   
 
We asked all survey recipients to provide suggestions for improving the auction procedures.  
Appendix A3.3 contains a transcript of all comments received by those with accepted offers, 
rejected offers, and non-participants, respectively.  Several suggested that the auction should be 
held earlier (for example in January or February).  Some suggested that a higher offer limit be 
imposed, and other felt that accepting all offers at a single price (possibly posting a single take-
it-or-leave-it price) would be an improvement.  A few respondents commented that they received 
their auction packets too close to the deadline to reply.  Another (non-participant) suggested 
sending a short initial mailing that would determine whether the farmer wanted to participate, 
and then sending the full auction packet only to interested farmers. 
 
Willingness to Install a Meter on Irrigation Pumps 
The final question that we posed to these farmers was whether they would be willing to have a 
sealed meter installed on the covered pumps, to be read annually by the EPD, if there was a 50-
percent cost share by the state.  Table 5.7 shows the results from this question.  Very few farmers 
indicated a willingness to do so.  Those with rejected offers showed the highest willingness to 
install such a pump.  Of these respondents, 29 percent would agree, 67 percent would not, and 
the remainder was uncertain.  Only 13 percent of those with accepted offers (and 12 percent of 
those with rejected offers) would be willing to install a meter at the specified 50-percent cost 
share.  In all cases, at least 60 percent of the respondents said they would not be willing to install 
such a pump under these conditions. 
 
We asked under what conditions these farmers would be willing to install a sealed meter.  
Transcripts of their responses are shown in Appendix A3.4.  Many said that more information 
was needed, and a large number said that they would be willing to only if the state paid 100 
percent of the costs.  Others said that it depended on the total cost, and some wanted such a 
metering system to be voluntary. 
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6.  SUMMARY 
 
Using economics experiments to guide policy has been described as “whispering in the ears of 
princes” (Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1995, p.22).  One could say that the 
experiments described in this report are the result of “princes whispering in our ears.”  This was 
a case where policy clearly guided our research agenda, while at the same time our research 
helped to guide policy. 
 
Our research showed the advantages of a simple posted price auction.  It performed as well as an 
iterative auction that used a maximum average price constraint, and had far lower 
implementation costs.  Moreover, its performance far exceeded a one-shot sealed offer auction.  
 
We were frankly skeptical of what we initially called the “Reheis Posted Offer Auction” – a 
sealed offer auction with an announced reservation price.  This auction captured the main 
features of the sealed offer and posted price auctions.  We thought that participants would focus 
on the $150 reservation price, and few (if any) offers would be made below this level.  While we 
expected no significant improvement in performance, we also felt there was no harm in trying 
this auction.  At worst, all submitted offer prices would be at the announced maximum; at best 
some offers would be less than this level. 
 
We were pleasantly surprised by how well this auction performed, both in the laboratory and in 
the field.  In the 2002 Irrigation Auction, only about 10 percent of the submitted offers were at 
the $150 maximum price, and the majority of offers were more than $10 below it.  Offers ranged 
from $74 to $150, with an average offer price of $132.74 (the average of the accepted offers was 
$127.96).  A total of 53,271 acres were offered in the auction, and in the end 40,861 acres were 
taken out of irrigation. 
 
Subsequent lab experiments indicate that this result is robust to whether the threat of taking is on 
the table.  In our experiments, the majority of offers were at prices below the announced 
maximum, and therefore average prices were lower than in a simple posted offer auction.  There 
was very little difference in offers between auctions conducted with taking and those without. 
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 A survey sent to all eligible farmers showed that most farmers whose offers were accepted 
intended to plant crops in 2002, even without irrigation.  The vast majority of farmers - 
participants and non-participants alike - preferred the 2002 auction mechanism to that utilized in 
2001.  Very few farmers expressed a willingness to install a sealed meter on their pump, at least 
under the 50-percent cost-share conditions we specified in our survey. 
 27
 
Table 2.1 
Sequence of Initial Experiments 
Date 
(all 2001) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Other Treatments 
Sept. 24 Old New (no max)  
Sept. 26 Old Old  
Oct. 3 Old New ($8 max)  
Oct. 8 Old New ($8 max) with announcement 
Oct. 10 (#1) Old Old with announcement 
Oct. 10 (#2) Old Old (told final round) with announcement 
Nov. 5 Old New ($8 max average) with announcement 
Nov. 7 Olda Old with announcement 
Nov. 8 Old Old with announcement 
a In this auction, we used a maximum price constraint of $8 in all rounds. 
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Table 3.1 
One-Shot and Follow-Up Experiments 
Date Treatment 
Dec. 3, 2001 New (Max Average Price = $18, Buy up to 3 per Round) 
Dec. 4, 2001 One-Shot Posted Price Auction, with Taking 
Dec. 5, 2001 One-Shot Sealed Offer Auction, with Taking 
Dec. 7, 2001 (#1) One-Shot Posted Price Auction, with Taking 
Dec. 7, 2001 (#2) One-Shot Sealed Offer Auction, with Taking 
Feb. 28, 2002 New (Max Average Price = $18, No Limit on Number Bought) 
April 4, 2002 One-Shot Sealed Offer, Announced Reservation Price, with Taking 
April 8, 2002 One-Shot Sealed Offer, Announced Reservation Price, with Taking 
April 24, 2002 One-Shot Sealed Offer, Announced Reservation Price, No Taking 
April 25, 2002 One-Shot Sealed Offer, Announced Reservation Price, No Taking 
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Table 5.1 
Survey Response: “Did you plant on this land last year?” (in 2001) 
 Accepted Offers 
Rejected 
Offers Non-Participants 
yes 87 % 95 % 87 % 
no 13 % 5 % 13 % 
number of responses 63 22 63 
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Table 5.2 
Distribution of Crops Planted in 2001 
 Accepted 
Offers 
Rejected 
Offers Non-Participants 
corn 6 % 8 % 24 % 
cotton 44 % 66 % 29 % 
peanuts 24 % 11 % 22 % 
other crops 25 % 15 % 26 % 
total acreage 7,887 2,598 9,653 
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Table 5.3 
Distribution of Crops Planted in 2002 
 Accepted 
Offers 
Rejected 
Offers Non-Participants 
corn 20 % 0 % 24 % 
cotton 31 % 33 % 28 % 
peanuts 20 % 43 % 22 % 
other crops 30 % 24 % 26 % 
total acreage 8,515 2,262 10,253 
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Table 5.4 
Effect of Auction Outcome on 2002 Farming Activity 
 yes no number of responses 
Accepted Offers: Will they plant, even though they cannot irrigate? 
 90 % 10 % 58 
Rejected Offers: If their offer had been accepted, would they have planted? 
 80 % 20 % 20 
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Table 5.5 
Effect of the $150 Reservation Price 
Prices at which permits would have been offered in the auction. 
(This was asked of non-participants only.) 
Price Proportion Offering 
$150.01 - $175 38 % 
$175.01 - $200 15 % 
$200.01 - $300 23 % 
$300.01 and higher 23 % 
number of responses 27 
 
 34
 
Table 5.6 
Comparison of 2001, 2001 Irrigation Auctions 
“Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was  
better or worse than last year’s?” 
 Accepted 
Offers 
Rejected 
Offers Non-Participants 
better 86 % 79 % 96 % 
worse 10 % 21 % 0 % 
same 4 % 7 % 4 % 
number of responses 52 14 27 
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Table 5.7 
Willingness to Install a Meter 
“Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was  50% cost-share by the state?” 
 Accepted 
Offers 
Rejected 
Offers Non-Participants 
yes 13 % 29 % 12 % 
no 60 % 67 % 67 % 
unsure 27 % 5 % 20 % 
number of responses 63 21 49 
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Figure 2.2 
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Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.4 
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Figure 2.5 
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Figure 2.6 
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Figure 2.7 
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Figure 2.8 
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Figure 3.1 
Average Cost of Obtaining Vouchers
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Figure 3.2 
Ratio of Cost to Value
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Figure 3.3 
Ratio: Cost to Min. Opp. Cost
Posted Price versus Sealed Offer (with taking)
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Figure 3.4 
Ratio of Cost to Value
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Figure 3.5 
Average Cost of Obtaining Vouchers
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Figure 3.6 
Ratio: Cost to Min. Opp. Cost
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Figure 3.7 
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Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.9 
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Figure 4.1 
Change in Offers from 2001 to 2002
a negative number implies the offered was lower in 2002 than in 2001
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Figure 4.2 
Average Cost of Taking Acreage from Irrigation
2001 versus 2002 auctions
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Figure 4.3 
Difference in Average Cost
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Figure 4.4 
Cumulative Number of Acres Offered
2001 versus 2002
< 100
100
100.01 - 124.99
125
125.01 - 139.99
140
140.01 - 145
145.01 - 149.99
150
150.01 - 199.99
200
> 200
offer price
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
thousands of acres
2001
 
2002
 57
Appendix 1 – Experiment Instructions and Announcements 
 
A1.1 Experiment Instructions, Replication of 2001 Irrigation Auction 
 
Welcome to our experiment.  Today, you will participate in an auction in which you will 
definitely earn money.  These instructions explain the rules of the auction and how your earnings 
will be determined. 
 
 Your envelope contained two vouchers—the two pink slips in your envelope. Please look 
at your vouchers now.  Each voucher has an identification number that has been assigned to you.  
On each one there is a value with a dollar sign.  This is the redemption  value of the voucher.  
In other words, at the end of the auction, you will be able to turn your voucher in to us and we 
will pay you this amount of money in cash.  It is possible that your two vouchers have different 
values written on them, and also that others in the auction may have different values than you do.  
We have enough cash with us to pay all of you for your vouchers. 
 
 However, you have a choice.  You can keep your voucher and at the end of the auction 
we will pay you its redemption value.  OR, you may sell one or both of your vouchers to us.  If 
you sell a voucher to us, you will receive the agreed upon price instead of the voucher’s 
redemption value.  Thus, for each voucher, you will earn either (but not both): 
 
* the dollar amount on the voucher, if you have not sold it to us. 
OR 
* the dollar amount that you have agreed to sell the voucher for. 
 
 There are ________ people participating in today's auction, and each person has 2 
vouchers; therefore there are a  total of ______ vouchers.  We will to try to buy a fixed number 
of vouchers, but we will not tell you how many this is.  We can tell you, however, that we have a 
fixed amount of money that we can use for the purpose of buying your vouchers: $375.   This is 
the most that we will spend to buy your vouchers in the auction (and does not include the money 
we will use to pay you for any vouchers that you do not sell).  It is possible that we will not 
spend this entire amount.  We also have a maximum average price and a maximum price that we 
are willing to pay for vouchers. However, we cannot reveal this maximum price and maximum 
average price. We will determine how many vouchers we will buy, and the amount you will 
receive for any vouchers you sell, in the following manner. 
 
1.  Your envelope contains a packet of “offer” cards – see the slips of paper that are stapled 
together.  The single sheet of paper is just something you can use to keep track of your offers.  
Look at your “offer cards.”  The first card says ROUND 1, and has two columns and two rows.  
Under the first column are the identification numbers for your two vouchers.  The second column 
is where you will enter your offer price for each one of your vouchers.  If you do not wish to 
offer one or both vouchers for sale, just write “none” on that voucher’s offer price line.  If you 
wish to offer to sell one or both of your vouchers, on that voucher's line write the price we would 
have to pay you in order for you to sell your voucher to us.  Remember: if you sell a voucher to 
us (that is, if we accept your offer price), you will not receive the voucher’s redemption value. 
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2. When the auction begins, fill out your Round 1 offer card, writing down your offer price for 
any of your vouchers that you wish to sell in the auction. You may offer to sell one of them, both 
of them, or neither of them.  It’s your choice.  When you have filled out your offer card, bring it 
into the computer room and hand the card to me or one of my assistants—just look for whoever 
is free.  STAY WITH US UNTIL WE HAVE ENTERED YOUR OFFER ON THE COMPUTER.  
We’ll show you what was entered, and we will ask you to verify that we have entered your offer 
correctly. 
 
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU VERIFY THE OFFER THAT WE ENTER ON THE 
COMPUTER.  If you find an error, tell one of us immediately.  We will make the 
necessary corrections.  If a mistake has been made, and you have not had it 
corrected, the amount entered in the computer is the one that will “count” in 
the auction. 
 
3.  When we have all of your offers, we will order them from the lowest cost offer to the highest 
cost offer.  We will then provisionally accept the lowest offers until either: (1) we have reached 
the maximum average offer price (or maximum price) that we will accept, (2) we’ve bought the 
number of vouchers that we have decided to buy, or (3) we have exhausted our funds; whichever 
we reach first.  If, at the maximum price that we can pay in a round, there is a “tie,” i.e., more 
than one voucher has been offered at that price, we will randomly choose which offers to accept.  
We will announce the identification numbers of the provisional winners.   
 
Suppose, for example, that the following offers were submitted: 
$500, $550, $451, $675, $800, $445, $525, $500 
(We have intentionally chosen numbers for this example that are larger than any that will be used 
in this auction.  With a budget of  $375 we could not accept any of these offers).  First, we would 
sort these offers from lowest to highest: 
 $445, $451, $500, $500, $525, $550, $675, $800 
We would start provisionally accepting the lowest priced offers (starting with $445) and continue 
until one of the three criteria above has been reached.  For example, if we had a budget of $2000 
we could provisionally accept the first four offers.  However, if our budget was only $1500, we 
could afford to buy only one of the two vouchers that were offered at $500 (in addition to the 
two lowest offers).  In this case, we would randomly choose one of the $500 offers to 
provisionally accept.  We would then announce the voucher number for each accepted offer. 
 
4.  After you have had a few minutes to think about whether any of your offers were 
provisionally accepted, we will announce the beginning of a new offer submission round.  
Everyone will have the opportunity to revise their offer prices.  In other words, if you would like 
to change your offer price for any of your vouchers -- or if you now wish to not sell one or both 
of your vouchers, you may make these changes now.  For one or both vouchers, if you want to 
change the offer price from the one that was used in the previous round, just write this amount in 
the Offer Price column for the appropriate voucher number.  For any voucher you don’t want to 
sell, just write “none” on the relevant line in the offer price column of your offer card. 
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IF THE DECISIONS THAT YOU MADE FOR THE LAST ROUND ARE THE SAME THAT YOU WANT TO MAKE 
FOR THE UPCOMING ROUND – I.E., YOU DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANY CHANGES FROM THE LAST 
ROUND'S OFFER – YOU DO NOT NEED TO SUBMIT A NEW "SUBMIT OFFERS" FORM.  IF YOU DO NOT 
SUBMIT A "SUBMIT OFFERS" FORM IN ANY ROUND, THE LAST RECORDED DECISION THAT YOU 
SUBMITTED WILL APPLY TO THE UPCOMING ROUND. 
 
5. When we have received all revised offers, once again we will rank the offer prices from lowest 
to highest price, choose the vouchers with the lowest price, and announce the provisional 
winners.  We will continue this process until: (1) at the end of an auction round, no one revises 
an offer; OR, (2) at some point we choose to end the auction.  When either of these events 
occurs, the auction is over, and the last-announced set of provisional winners will be the final 
winners.  They will sell us their vouchers and will receive their offer prices.  No results from any 
previous rounds will count. 
 
6.  If you do not sell one or both of your vouchers, you will receive the redemption value that is 
written on that voucher.  At the end of the auction, you will receive a receipt form that shows 
your earnings from this auction.  After this, you will participate in another decision-making 
experiment. 
 
Before we begin the auction, we want to be sure that you understand how your earnings are 
determined in this auction.  Please answer the following questions.  When you are done, raise 
your hand and one of us will come by and check your answers. 
 
1.  Write the redemption value for your two vouchers in the spaces below: 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________  Voucher 2: ________________  
 
2.  For each of these two vouchers, write an offer price in the spaces below.  You will use this 
offer price in order to calculate example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a 
different offer price if you wish.  Nothing in this example will have any effect on your 
earnings. 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________  Voucher 2: ________________  
 
Use your vouchers' redemption values and the offer prices that you wrote above to answer the 
following questions. 
 
3.  If neither of your offers are accepted (that is, if you don't sell either voucher), how much 
would you earn in this experiment? 
 
 
4.  If your offer for voucher 1 is accepted, but your offer for voucher 2 is not, how much would 
you earn in this experiment? 
 
 
5.  If your offer for voucher 2 is accepted, but your offer for voucher 1 is not, how much would 
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you earn in this experiment? 
 
 
6.  If both of your offers were accepted, how much would you earn in this experiment? 
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A1.2 Experiment Instructions, Auction Where Only Rejected Offers Can Be 
Revised 
 
This auction is exactly like the one you just completed with ONE DIFFERENCE: THE 
WAY IN WHICH WE ACCEPT OFFER PRICES. 
 
In this auction, you will submit your offers just like you did in the last auction.  However, after 
we have all of your offers, and have ordered them from the lowest cost offer to the highest cost 
offer, we will actually buy the three vouchers with the lowest offer prices.  In other words, we 
no longer will have “provisional” winners.  We buy the three vouchers with the lowest offer 
price at the end of each round. We will announce the identification numbers of the three 
vouchers that have been purchased.  If there is a “tie” – more than one voucher has one of the 
three lowest offer prices - we will randomly choose which offers to accept.  Also, we may buy 
fewer than three vouchers if the average offer price of the three lowest offers is greater than the 
maximum average offer price that we are willing to pay, or if offer prices exceed the maximum 
price that we can pay. 
 
IF YOUR OFFER WAS ONE OF THE THREE ACCEPTED, YOU HAVE DEFINITELY SOLD THAT VOUCHER TO 
US.  Therefore, you cannot make any further offers regarding this voucher.  If your second 
voucher was not purchased, you can make offers to sell that one. 
 
At the end of the first round, after you have had a chance to think about whether or not we have 
purchased one of your vouchers, we will announce the beginning of a new offer submission 
round.  Everyone will have the opportunity to revise their offer prices (for any vouchers that 
were not purchased in an earlier round).  In other words, if you would like to change your offer 
price for any of your vouchers -- or if you now wish to not sell one or both of your vouchers, you 
may make these changes now (again, this does not apply to vouchers that we purchased in an 
earlier round).  For one or both vouchers, if you want to change the offer price from the one that 
was used in the previous round, just write this amount in the Offer Price column for the 
appropriate voucher number.  For any voucher you don’t want to sell, just write “none” on the 
relevant line in the offer price column of your offer card. 
 
IF THE DECISIONS THAT YOU MADE FOR THE LAST ROUND ARE THE SAME THAT YOU WANT TO MAKE 
FOR THE UPCOMING ROUND – I.E., YOU DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANY CHANGES FROM THE LAST 
ROUND'S OFFER – YOU DO NOT NEED TO SUBMIT A NEW "SUBMIT OFFERS" FORM.  IF YOU DO NOT 
SUBMIT A "SUBMIT OFFERS" FORM IN ANY ROUND, THE LAST RECORDED DECISION THAT YOU 
SUBMITTED WILL APPLY TO THE UPCOMING ROUND. 
 
When we have received all revised offers, once again we will rank the offer prices from lowest to 
highest price, purchase the three vouchers with the lowest prices, and announce the identification 
numbers of the three vouchers that we have just purchased in the most recent round. 
 
We will continue this process until: (1) at the end of an auction round, no one revises an offer; 
OR, (2) at some point we choose to end the auction.  When either of these events occur, the 
auction is over.  We will  not purchase any more vouchers after this. 
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If you do not sell one or both of your vouchers, you will receive the redemption value that is 
written on that voucher.  At the end of the auction, you will receive a receipt form that shows 
your earnings from this auction.   
 
After this auction is completed, you will participate in another decision-making experiment. 
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A1.3 Experiment Announcements 
 
Announcement 1: Read After Instructions Have Been Finished (used in all sessions) 
  
To be sure that you understand the auction procedures, we will first run a trial auction.  
Everything will be done exactly as it will during the real auction (you will submit offers, we will 
announce provisional winners, you will be given a chance to submit revised offers, etc.).  The 
only difference is that you will NOT earn any money in this trial auction. 
 
Even though this trial auction will not affect your earnings, it may give you an idea of what to 
expect during the auction.  Therefore, it is in your interest to take it seriously and to submit offers 
as you would during the actual auction.  Just as during the real auction, this trial auction will end 
when no one submits a revised offer or when we decide to end the auction. 
 
Before we get started, are there any questions? 
 
 
Announcement 2: Read After the Trial Auction Has Finished (used in all sessions) 
 
We are about to start the auction in which you will be paid. 
 
Before the auction starts we will give you a few minutes to discuss what happened during the 
trial auction, or to talk about anything else that you want to discuss.  You can talk about 
strategies if you like.  If you have any questions at all that you would like to ask us, please do so. 
 
During the auction, feel free to talk with one another while you are submitting your offers or 
while you are waiting to obtain provisional results. 
 
 
Announcement 3A: Read in After the First Experiment (2001 Replication) has Finished 
(used in sessions where the old procedures are followed by the “old” iterative auction 
where all offers can be revised) 
 
You have just received detailed information about those offers we accepted in the auction you 
just participated in.  You might notice that we did not spend the entire budget of $375.  However, 
many more offers were accepted (and at higher prices) in the final round than were provisionally 
accepted in any earlier round of the auction. 
 
You will receive a receipt showing your auction earnings in a moment. 
 
In a few minutes, we will start another auction with the same rules as the auction you just 
participated in. 
 
Before we start the next auction, please take about 5 minutes to discuss what happened during 
the last auction.  You can talk about your own experiences and strategies.  You might also want 
to think about the information we just gave you about the accepted offers in this auction. 
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As in the last auction, you can talk about strategies if you like.  If you have any questions at all 
that you would like to ask us, please do so. 
 
During the auction, feel free to talk with one another while you are submitting your offers or 
while you are waiting to obtain provisional results. 
 
Announcement 3B: Read in After the First Experiment (2001 Replication) has Finished 
(used in sessions where the old procedures are followed by the “new” iterative auction 
where only rejected offers can be revised) 
 
You have just received detailed information about those offers we accepted in the auction you 
just participated in.  You might notice that we did not spend the entire budget of $375.  However, 
many more offers were accepted (and at higher prices) in the final round than were provisionally 
accepted in any earlier round of the auction. 
 
You will receive a receipt showing your auction earnings in a moment. 
 
In a few minutes, we will start another auction with somewhat different rules about which offers 
we accept.  (We will give you the instructions for this shortly) 
 
Before we start the next auction, please take about 5 minutes to discuss what happened during 
the last auction.  You can talk about your own experiences and strategies.  You might also want 
to think about the information we just gave you about the accepted offers in this auction. 
 
As in the last auction, you can talk about strategies if you like.  If you have any questions at all 
that you would like to ask us, please do so. 
 
During the auction, feel free to talk with one another while you are submitting your offers or 
while you are waiting to obtain provisional results. 
 
Announcement 3C: Read in After the First Experiment (2001 Procedures, but with an $8 
maximum price used in all rounds) has Finished (used in sessions where the old procedures 
are followed by the “old” iterative auction where all offers can be revised) 
 
You have just received detailed information about those offers we accepted in the auction you 
just participated in. 
 
You will receive a receipt showing your auction earnings in a moment. 
 
In a few minutes, we will start another auction with the same rules as the auction you just 
participated in. 
 
Before we start the next auction, please take about 5 minutes to discuss what happened during 
the last auction.  You can talk about your own experiences and strategies.  You might also want 
to think about the information we just gave you about the accepted offers in this auction. 
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As in the last auction, you can talk about strategies if you like.  If you have any questions at all 
that you would like to ask us, please do so. 
 
During the auction, feel free to talk with one another while you are submitting your offers or 
while you are waiting to obtain provisional results. 
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A1.4 Experiment Instructions, Posted Offer Auction 
 
Welcome to our experiment.  Today, you will participate in an auction in which you will 
definitely earn money.  These instructions explain the rules of the auction and how your earnings 
will be determined. 
 
 You have an envelope that contains two vouchers—the two pink slips in your envelope. 
Please look at your vouchers now.  Each voucher has a 4-digit identification number.  The first 
digit – number – identifies your voucher (you have two vouchers, which start with a 1 and a 2 
respectively). 
  
On each of your vouchers there is also a value with a dollar sign.  This is the 
redemption value of the voucher.  In other words, at the end of the auction, you can turn your 
voucher in to us and we will pay you this amount of money in cash.  Is that clear?  It is possible 
that your two vouchers have different values written on them, and also that others in the auction 
may have different values than you do.  However, each voucher may be turned in to us at the end 
of the auction for the amount of money written on the front of it.  We have enough cash with us 
to pay all of you for your vouchers. 
 
 However, you have a choice.  You can keep your voucher and cash it in at the end of the 
auction for the amount of money that is written on it.  OR, you may sell one or both of your 
vouchers to us.  We will pay you $18.00 for each voucher that you sell to us.   You can offer to 
sell us one or both of your vouchers for $18.00.  If you sell a voucher to us, you will receive 
$18.00 instead of the dollar amount on the voucher – the voucher’s redemption value.  Thus, for 
each voucher, you will earn either (but not both): 
 
* the dollar amount on the voucher, if you have not sold it to us. 
OR 
*$18.00 if you have sold your voucher to us. 
 
 There are ________ people participating in today's auction, and each person has 2 
vouchers; therefore there are a  total of ______ vouchers.  We have a target for the number of 
vouchers that we want to purchase.  For this purpose, we don’t care anything about the voucher’s 
redemption value, or who owns the voucher: we just have a target for the number of vouchers 
that we want to acquire.  Sorry, but we cannot tell you this target number. 
  
The auction will work in the following manner: 
 
1.  We will now give you a decision sheet that you will use to tell us what you want to do 
during the auction.  If you wish to sell one or both of your vouchers for $18.00, put an X in the 
box on the right side of this form (“Sell Voucher and Receive $18.00”).  If you do not wish to 
sell this voucher for $18.00, put an X in the box on the left side of this form (“Keep Voucher and 
Receive Redemption Value of …”).  After you have made your decision as to which, if any, 
vouchers you wish to sell, we will collect these record sheets from you.  Remember: if you sell 
a voucher to us for $18.00 you will not receive the voucher’s redemption value. 
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2.  When we have all of your record sheets, we will consider all of the vouchers that have 
been offered for sale at a price of $18.00.  For these people, we will buy vouchers until either: (1) 
we’ve reached our target number of vouchers that we want to buy, or (2) we have exhausted our 
funds; whichever happens first.  If more vouchers are offered for sale that we need to meet our 
target number of vouchers, we will randomly choose vouchers to buy in order to meet our target. 
 
3.  We will then announce the identification numbers of the vouchers that we have 
purchased.    If you do not sell one or both of your vouchers for $18.00, you will receive the 
redemption value that is written on that voucher.  At the end of the auction, you will receive a 
receipt form that shows your earnings from this auction. 
 
 
 
Important Additional Information 
 
THERE IS ONE LAST THING THAT YOU NEED TO UNDERSTAND.  If you do not sell one or both of 
your vouchers in the auction, we have said that you will receive its redemption value.  THERE 
IS AN EXCEPTION to this rule that you must understand. 
 
You were told earlier that we have a target number of vouchers that we must acquire.  We will 
try to purchase our target number of vouchers during the auction.  However, if we are unable to 
reach our target during the auction, we will involuntarily take enough vouchers from you to 
reach our target.  Here is how this will work, and how you will be compensated if your voucher 
is involuntarily taken from you. 
 
-- All sales made during the auction are final.  In other words, if you sold a voucher to us during 
the auction you will definitely receive $18.00 for your voucher.  It cannot now be taken.  Only 
vouchers NOT sold during the auction may be taken. 
 
-- The number of vouchers we take will be the difference between our target and the number of 
vouchers that we bought during the auction.  For example, if our target was 1,000 vouchers but 
we were able to purchase only 990 vouchers during the auction, we would have to take 10 
vouchers. 
 
-- If we take your voucher, you will not receive its redemption value.  Instead, you will receive 
$18.00 – the amount paid for vouchers during the auction.  This amount, $18.00, may be less 
than, the same as, or greater than your voucher’s redemption value.  Anyone who has an unsold 
voucher that is taken will receive $18.00 for the voucher regardless of their unsold voucher’s 
redemption value.   
 
The vouchers that are taken will be determined in the following manner: 
 
-- Look at your identification number that is given in the upper left-hand corner of your 
envelope.  This is the same number as the last two digits on each of your vouchers.  
Among all of you, these digits start at 01 and increases to higher numbers.  In other 
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words someone in the room has an ID number ending in 01, someone else has 02, then 
03, 04, and so on. 
 
-- We will start with the lowest ID number (01) on a voucher.  If this voucher was not 
sold in the auction, we will take this voucher and pay the voucher’s owner (participant 
#01) $18.00 for the voucher.  (Remember, any vouchers sold in the auction are NOT 
included in this)  We then go to the next lowest voucher number (e.g., 02).  If this 
voucher was sold in the auction, we go to the next lowest voucher number; if not, we take 
the voucher and pay the voucher’s owner $18.00 for the voucher.  We continue this 
process, moving to higher and higher voucher ID numbers until we reach our target 
number of vouchers. 
 
To summarize.  You have two vouchers.  Look at the top half of your decision sheet, at the 
information for your first voucher.  Look at the redemption value (the amount of money you 
receive for this voucher if it is not sold or taken); this is shown on the left side of page.  You will 
decide whether or not you wish to sell your Voucher #1 for $18.00.  If you want to sell it, put an 
X in the box on the right side of this form (“Sell Voucher and Receive $18.00”).  If you do not 
wish to sell this voucher for $18.00, put an X in the box on the left side of this form (“Keep 
Voucher and Receive Redemption Value of …”).   
Now look at the bottom half of your decision sheet, at the information for your Voucher 
#2.  You’ll do the same thing: do you want to sell it for $18.00?  If so, put an X in the box on the 
right side of this form (“Sell Voucher and Receive $18.00”).  If you do not wish to sell this 
voucher for $18.00, put an X in the box on the left side of this form (“Keep Voucher and Receive 
Redemption Value of …”).  Remember, if we do not get our target number of vouchers in the 
auction, we will buy UNSOLD vouchers from you (and pay $18.00 for the taken vouchers) 
beginning with the lowest ID number and working up to higher ID numbers until we hit our 
target.  Before you turn in your decision sheet, we want you to initial the statement that tells you 
this. 
 
Thus, you will receive one of the following amounts of money for each of your two 
vouchers. 
 
 $18.00 if your we buy your voucher from you. 
 
OR 
 
 $18.00 IF you have not sold the voucher in the auction and it is “taken” (that 
is, if we have not reached our target number of vouchers by the time that we 
get to your voucher ID number). 
 
OR 
 
 The voucher’s redemption value (the dollar amount on your voucher) IF you 
have not sold the voucher in the auction, and if we do not take your voucher. 
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Before we begin the auction, we want to be sure that you understand how your earnings 
are determined in this auction.  Please answer the following questions.  When you are done, raise 
your hand and one of us will come by and check your answers. Nothing in this example will 
have any effect on your earnings. 
Start with your Voucher 1.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________    
 
(a) If you do not sell Voucher 1 in the auction, and if we do not take the voucher involuntarily, 
how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?   
 
(b) If you do not sell Voucher #1 in the auction, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?  
 
( c ) If you do sell Voucher #1 in the auction, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1? 
 
Now look at your Voucher 2.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 2: ________________    
 
(a) If you do not sell Voucher 2 in the auction, and if we do not take the voucher involuntarily, 
how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?   
 
(b) If you do not sell Voucher #2 in the auction, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?  
 
( c ) If you do sell Voucher #2 in the auction, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2? 
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A1.5 Experiment Instructions, One-Shot Sealed Offer Auction 
 
Welcome to our experiment.  Today, you will participate in an auction in which you will 
definitely earn money.  These instructions explain the rules of the auction and how your earnings 
will be determined. 
 
 You have an envelope that contains two vouchers—the two pink slips in your envelope. 
Please look at your vouchers now.  Each voucher has a 4-digit identification number.  The first 
digit – number – identifies your voucher (you have two vouchers, which start with a 1 and a 2 
respectively). 
  
On each of your vouchers there is also a value with a dollar sign.  This is the 
redemption value of the voucher.  In other words, at the end of the auction, you can turn your 
voucher in to us and we will pay you this amount of money in cash.  Is that clear?  It is possible 
that your two vouchers have different values written on them, and also that others in the auction 
may have different values than you do.  However, each voucher may be turned in to us at the end 
of the auction for the amount of money written on the front of it.  We have enough cash with us 
to pay all of you for your vouchers. 
 
 However, you have a choice.  You can keep your voucher and cash it in at the end of the 
auction for the amount of money that is written on it.  OR, you may sell one or both of your 
vouchers to us for some price.  You can offer to sell us one or both of your vouchers for any 
price that you determine.  The price at which you offer to sell a voucher is your OFFER PRICE 
for the voucher.  Again, YOU determine the offer price for each voucher – you determine the 
amount of money we would have to pay you for you to give up your voucher.  If you sell a 
voucher to us, you will receive your OFFER PRICE instead of the dollar amount on the voucher 
– the voucher’s redemption value.  Thus, for each voucher, you will earn either (but not both): 
 
* the dollar amount on the voucher, if you have not sold it to us. 
OR 
*your OFFER price – the dollar amount that you have agreed to sell the voucher for – 
if you have sold your voucher to us. 
 
 There are ________ people participating in today's auction, and each person has 2 
vouchers; therefore there are a total of ______ vouchers.  We have a target for the number of 
vouchers that we want to purchase.  For this purpose, we don’t care anything about the voucher’s 
redemption value, or who owns the voucher: we just have a target for the number of vouchers 
that we want to acquire.  Sorry, but we cannot tell you this target number.  We can tell you, 
however, that we have a fixed amount of money that we can use for the purpose of buying your 
vouchers: $      .   This is the most that we will spend to buy your vouchers in the auction (and 
does not include the money we will use to pay you for any vouchers that you do not sell).  It is 
possible that we will not spend this entire amount.   
 
We also have a maximum average price that we are willing to pay for vouchers. However, 
we cannot reveal this maximum average price.   
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We will determine how many vouchers we will buy, and the amount you will receive for any 
vouchers you sell, in the following manner. 
 
1.  If you wish to sell one or both of your vouchers, just write your offer price – the amount 
of money we would have to pay you for you to sell your voucher to us – on the front of the 
voucher(s) you wish to sell.  If you do not wish to sell a voucher, write Not For Sale on the front 
of the voucher.  After you have made your decision as to which, if any, vouchers you wish to sell 
and your offer price(s), put both vouchers back into your envelope.  We will pick up all of your 
envelopes.  Remember: if you sell a voucher to us (that is, if we accept your offer price), you 
will not receive the voucher’s redemption value. 
 
2. When we have all of your vouchers, for all vouchers that are offered for sale (people have 
written 
 an offer price on their voucher), we will order them from the lowest offer price to the highest 
offer price.   Starting with the lowest offer price, we will buy that voucher, then the voucher with 
the next lowest offer price, and continue buying vouchers with the lowest offer prices until 
either: (1) we reach the maximum average offer price that we will accept, (2) we’ve reached our 
target number of vouchers that we want to buy, or (3) we have exhausted our funds; whichever 
happens first.  If, at the highest offer price that we can pay in a round, there is a “tie,” i.e., more 
than one voucher has been offered at the highest accepted price, we will randomly choose which 
offers to accept.   
 
We will then announce the identification numbers of the vouchers that we have purchased.     
 
Suppose, for example, that the following offer prices were submitted: 
 
$500, $550, $451, $675, $800, $445, $525, $500 
(We have intentionally chosen numbers for this example that are larger than any that will be used 
in this auction.  With a budget of  $       we could not accept any of these offers).  
 
First, we would sort these offer prices from lowest to highest: 
 
 $445, $451, $500, $500, $525, $550, $675, $800 
 
We would start accepting the voucher with the lowest offer price (starting with $445) and 
continue until one of the three criteria above has been reached.  For example, if we had a budget 
of $2000 we could accept the first four offers.  However, if our budget was only $1500, we could 
afford to accept the $445 offer, the $451 offer, and only one of the two $500 offers.    In this 
case, we would randomly choose one of the two $500 offers to accept.    
 
As another example, if the maximum average offer price that we can accept was $446, 
we would be able to accept only the first voucher with the $445 offer price.  If we accepted the 
second offer price of $451, the average accepted offer price would be $448 ([$445+$451]/2 = 
448), which is greater than our maximum acceptable offer price of $446.  
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After we have determined the vouchers that we will buy, we will then announce the voucher 
number for each accepted offer price.  If your offer price is one of the ones that we accept, you 
have definitely sold that voucher to us and will receive your offer price for the voucher.   
 
If you do not sell one or both of your vouchers, you will receive the redemption value that is 
written on that voucher.  At the end of the auction, you will receive a receipt form that shows 
your earnings from this auction. 
 
Important Additional Information 
 
THERE IS ONE LAST THING THAT YOU NEED TO UNDERSTAND.  If you do not sell one or both of 
your vouchers in the auction, we have said that you will receive its redemption value.  THERE 
IS AN EXCEPTION to this rule that you must understand. 
 
You were told earlier that we have a target number of vouchers that we must acquire.  We will 
try to purchase our target number of vouchers during the auction.  However, if we are unable to 
reach our target during the auction, we will involuntarily take enough vouchers from you to 
reach our target.  Here is how this will work, and how you will be compensated if your voucher 
is involuntarily taken from you. 
 
-- All sales made during the auction are final.  In other words, if you sold a voucher to us during 
the auction you will definitely receive your offer price.  It cannot now be taken.  Only vouchers 
NOT sold during the auction may be taken. 
 
-- The number of vouchers we take will be the difference between our target and the number of 
vouchers that we bought during the auction.  For example, if our target was 1,000 vouchers but 
we were able to purchase only 990 vouchers during the auction (by staying within our budget 
and maximum average price restrictions), we would have to take 10 vouchers. 
 
-- If we take your voucher, you will not receive its redemption value.  Instead, you will receive 
the average price paid for vouchers in the auction.  This average price may be less than, the 
same as, or greater than your voucher’s redemption value.  We will calculate this average price 
by adding up the price paid for each voucher sold in the auction, and then dividing by the 
number of vouchers sold.  For example, if three vouchers were sold during the auction at prices 
of $500, $540, and $460, the average price paid in the auction would be ($500 + $540 + $460)/3 
= $500.  The three people who sold their vouchers during the auction would receive their offer 
prices, $500, $540, and $460 respectively.  Anyone who has an unsold voucher that is taken 
would receive $500, regardless of their unsold voucher’s redemption value.  (As before, we have 
chosen numbers that are higher than any that will be used in the auction) 
 
-- The vouchers that are taken will be determined in the following manner: 
 
-- Look at your identification number that is given in the upper left-hand corner of your 
envelope.  This is the same number as the last two digits on each of your vouchers.  
Among all of you, these digits start at 01 and increases to higher numbers.  In other 
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words someone in the room has an ID number ending in 01, someone else has 02, then 
03, 04, and so on. 
 
-- We will start with the lowest ID number (01) on a voucher.  If this voucher was not 
sold in the auction, we will take this voucher and pay the voucher’s owner (participant 
#01) the average price paid in the auction.  (Remember, any vouchers sold in the auction 
are NOT included in this)  We then go to the next lowest voucher number (e.g., 02).  If 
this voucher was sold in the auction, we go to the next lowest voucher number; if not, we 
take the voucher and pay the voucher’s owner the average price paid in the auction.  We 
continue this process, moving to higher and higher voucher ID numbers until we reach 
our target number of vouchers. 
 
To summarize, you have two vouchers.  Everyone look at the first voucher, Voucher #1.  You 
will decide whether or not you wish to sell your Voucher #1.  If you want to sell it, you must 
determine your offer price for Voucher #1: how much would we have to pay you for you to sell 
us this voucher?  You would write your offer price on the front of the voucher.  If you do not 
want to sell Voucher #1, you write “Not For Sale” on the front of the voucher.  Now look at your 
Voucher #2.  You’ll do the same thing: do you want to sell it, if so what is your offer price?  
Write the offer price on Voucher #2.  If you don’t want to sell it, write “Not for Sale” on the 
front of Voucher #2.  When you’ve made these decisions for both of your vouchers, put them in 
your envelope.   Remember, if we do not get our target number of vouchers in the auction, we 
will buy UNSOLD vouchers from you (and pay the average price paid in the auction) beginning 
with the lowest ID number and working up to higher ID numbers until we hit our target. 
 
Thus, you will receive one of the following amounts of money for each of your two 
vouchers. 
 
 Your offer price if your offer price is accepted and we buy your voucher from 
you. 
 
OR 
 
 The average price paid for vouchers in the auction IF you have not sold the 
voucher in the auction and it is “taken” (that is, if we have not reached our 
target number of vouchers by the time that we get to your voucher ID 
number). 
 
OR 
 
 The voucher’s redemption value, the dollar amount on your voucher, IF you 
have not sold the voucher in the auction, and if we do not take your voucher. 
 
 
Before we begin the auction, we want to be sure that you understand how your earnings are 
determined in this auction.  Please answer the following questions.  When you are done, raise 
your hand and one of us will come by and check your answers. 
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Start with your Voucher 1.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Now write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to 
calculate example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you 
wish.  Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Suppose that the average price paid in the auction was $5.00 (we’re using an arbitrarily chosen 
number that may be higher or lower than the redemption value for your voucher; again, this is 
just an example) Use your vouchers' redemption value, your offer price for the voucher, and 
information about the average price paid in the auction to answer the following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 1 in the auction), and if 
we do not take the voucher involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?   
 
(b) If your offer for voucher 1 is not accepted, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?  
 
( c ) If your offer for voucher 1 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1? 
 
Now look at your Voucher 2.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to calculate 
example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you wish.  
Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Suppose that the average price paid in the auction was $5.00 (we’re using an arbitrarily chosen 
number that may be higher or lower than the redemption value for your voucher; again, this is 
just an example) Use your vouchers' redemption value, your offer price for the voucher, and 
information about the average price paid in the auction to answer the following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 2 in the auction), and if 
we do not take the voucher involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?   
 
(b) If your offer for Voucher 2 is not accepted, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?  
 
( c  ) If your offer for Voucher 2 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2? 
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A1.6 Experiment Instructions, Sealed Offer Auction with Announced 
Reservation Price, with taking 
 
 Welcome to our experiment.  Today, you will participate in an auction in which you will 
definitely earn money.  These instructions explain the rules of the auction and how your earnings 
will be determined. 
 
Earning Money In This Experiment 
 
 You have an envelope that contains two vouchers—the two pink slips in your envelope. 
Please look at your vouchers now.  Each voucher has a 4-digit identification number.  The first 
digit – number – identifies your voucher (you have two vouchers, which start with a 1 and a 2 
respectively). 
  
On each of your vouchers there is also a value with a dollar sign.  This is the 
redemption value of the voucher.  In other words, at the end of the auction, you can turn your 
voucher in to us and we will pay you this amount of money in cash.  Is that clear?  It is possible 
that your two vouchers have different values written on them, and also that others in the auction 
may have different values than you do.  However, each voucher may be turned in to us at the end 
of the auction for the amount of money written on the front of it.  We have enough cash with us 
to pay all of you for your vouchers. 
 
 However, you have a choice.  You can keep your voucher and cash it in at the end of the 
auction for the amount of money that is written on it.  OR, you may offer to sell one or both of 
your vouchers to us for some price.  We will call the price at which you offer to sell your 
voucher is your OFFER PRICE. 
 
 If we accept your offer to sell a voucher to us, you will receive your OFFER PRICE.  In this 
case, you will return the voucher to us in exchange for this offer price.  In other words, you will 
receive the offer price instead of the dollar amount of the voucher (the voucher’s redemption 
value). 
 
 If, on the other hand, we do not accept your offer to sell your voucher you will keep it 
and receive the REDEMPTION VALUE written on the voucher.  Thus, for each voucher, you will 
earn either (but not both): 
 
* the dollar amount on the voucher, if you have not sold it to us (whether or not you offered to 
sell it). 
OR 
*your OFFER PRICE if you have sold your voucher to us. 
 
How We Choose Which Offers to Accept 
 
 There are ________ people participating in today's auction, and each person has 2 
vouchers; therefore there are a total of ______ vouchers.  We have a target for the number of 
 76
vouchers that we want to purchase.  For this purpose, we don’t care anything about the voucher’s 
redemption value, or who owns the voucher: we just have a target for the number of vouchers 
that we want to acquire, and also a fixed amount of money for buying your vouchers (in addition 
to the money we will use to pay you for any vouchers we do not sell).  However, we cannot tell 
you either the voucher target or our budget available to buy vouchers. 
 
We also have a maximum price that we are willing to pay for vouchers. We will entertain all 
offers up to a maximum price of $19.40.  Lower offers will be accepted first, followed by 
progressively higher offers until we obtain our target number of vouchers.  Thus, low offers 
stand a greater chance of being accepted.  If there are more offers to sell vouchers at the 
maximum accepted price than required to meet our target, the following procedures will be 
employed: All offers below the maximum accepted price will definitely be accepted.  We will 
then obtain the additional vouchers required by randomly choosing among all offers at the 
maximum accepted price until we have met our target. 
 
For example, suppose that we are unable to obtain our target number of vouchers if we 
accepted only those offers at prices below $19.40; however if we accepted all offers at or below 
$19.40 we would exceed our voucher target.  In this case we would accept all offers below 
$19.40 and then randomly choose among the $19.40 offers until we meet our target.  In other 
words, all offers below $19.40 are accepted, but only some of those offers at $19.40 will be 
accepted. 
 
Of course, the maximum accepted price might be less than $19.40.  In this case, the same 
procedures would be followed:  all offers below the maximum accepted price would be accepted 
and then we would randomly choose among those at the maximum price until we meet our 
voucher target. 
 
Auction Procedures 
 
1. Please look at your Offer Form, which is the last page attached to these instructions.  The 
top half of the form refers to your first voucher and the bottom refers to your second 
voucher.  If you wish to offer a voucher for sale, just write your offer price – the amount 
of money we would have to pay you for you to sell your voucher to us – in the space 
indicated for any voucher(s) you wish to sell.  If you do not wish to sell a voucher, write 
NS in the space indicated. 
 
2.  After you have made these decisions, bring your Offer Form to one of us in the lab.  
Remember: if we accept your offer, you will receive your offer price instead of the 
dollar amount written on the voucher.  If your offer is NOT accepted (or if you do not 
offer your voucher for sale) you will receive its redemption value. 
 
3. When we have all of your Offer Forms, we will enter all offers to sell vouchers.  We will 
order them from the lowest offer price to the highest offer price.   Starting with the lowest 
offer price, we will buy that voucher, then the voucher with the next lowest offer price, 
and continue buying vouchers with the lowest offer prices until either: (1) we’ve reached 
our target number of vouchers; or (2) we have exhausted our funds; whichever happens 
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first.  If, at the highest offer price that we can pay in a round, there is a “tie,” i.e., more 
than one voucher has been offered at the highest accepted price, we will randomly choose 
which offers to accept.  As we described above, in this case, all offers below this highest 
accepted price will be definitely accepted. 
 
4. We will then announce the voucher numbers for those vouchers that we have purchased.  
Each person whose offer was accepted will receive the offer price for any voucher(s) 
accepted.  All other vouchers will be exchanged for their redemption values. 
 
 
Important Additional Information 
 
THERE IS ONE LAST THING THAT YOU NEED TO UNDERSTAND.  If you do not sell one or both of 
your vouchers in the auction, we have said that you will receive its redemption value.  THERE 
IS AN EXCEPTION to this rule that you must understand. 
 
We told you earlier that we have a target number of vouchers that we must acquire.  We will try 
to purchase our target number of vouchers during the auction.  However, if we are unable to 
reach our target during the auction, we will involuntarily take enough vouchers from you to 
reach our target.  Here is how this will work, and how you will be compensated if your voucher 
is involuntarily taken from you. 
 
1. All sales made during the auction are final.  In other words, if you sold a voucher to us 
during the auction you will definitely receive your offer price.  It cannot now be taken.  
Only vouchers NOT sold during the auction may be taken. 
 
2. If you did not sell your voucher in the auction and we take your voucher, you will not 
receive its redemption value.  Instead, you will receive the average price paid for 
vouchers in the auction.  This average price may be less than, the same as, or greater than 
your voucher’s redemption value.  We will calculate this average price by adding up the 
price paid for each voucher sold in the auction, and then dividing by the number of 
vouchers sold. 
For example, if three vouchers were sold during the auction at prices of $500, 
$540, and $460, the average price paid in the auction would be ($500 + $540 + $460)/3 = 
$500.  The three people who sold their vouchers during the auction would receive their 
offer prices, $500, $540, and $460 respectively.  Anyone who has an unsold voucher that 
is taken would receive $500, regardless of their unsold voucher’s redemption value.  (For 
this example, we have chosen numbers that are higher than any that will be used in the 
auction.) 
 
3. The number of vouchers we take will be the difference between our target and the 
number of vouchers that we bought during the auction.  For example, if our target was 
1,000 vouchers but we were able to purchase only 990 vouchers during the auction, we 
would have to take 10 vouchers. 
 
4. We will determine which vouchers to take based on the voucher number, starting with the 
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lowest voucher number and moving to progressively higher numbers until we meet our 
target 
We will start with the lowest voucher number (1001).  If this voucher was not 
sold in the auction, we will take this voucher and pay this voucher’s owner the average 
price paid in the auction.  (Remember, if this voucher was sold in the auction, we will 
simply go on to the next voucher; it cannot now be taken.)  We then go to the next 
highest voucher number (1002).  If this voucher was sold in the auction, we go on to the 
next lowest number.  If not, we take voucher 1002 and pay the owner the average price 
paid in the auction. 
We continue this process, moving to higher and higher voucher ID numbers until 
we reach our target number of vouchers. 
 
It is our hope that we will obtain enough vouchers in the voluntary auction.  However, if not 
enough vouchers are obtained we will implement these provisions. 
 
Summary 
 
Everyone has two vouchers.  You must decide for each voucher whether you wish to sell it (at a 
price at or below $19.40).  If you want to sell it, write your offer price in the appropriate part of 
your offer form.  If you do not want to sell it, write NS on your offer form.  When you’ve made 
your decisions for both vouchers, bring your offer form to us in the lab. 
 
Remember, if we do not get our target number of vouchers in the auction, we will buy UNSOLD 
vouchers from you (and pay the average price paid in the auction) beginning with the lowest 
voucher ID number and working up to higher ID numbers until we hit our target. 
 
Thus, you will receive one of the following amounts of money for each of your two 
vouchers. 
 
 Your offer price if your offer price is accepted and we buy your voucher from 
you. 
 
OR 
 
 The average price paid for vouchers in the auction IF you have not sold the 
voucher in the auction and it is “taken” (that is, if we have not reached our 
target number of vouchers by the time that we get to your voucher ID 
number). 
 
OR 
 
 The voucher’s redemption value, the dollar amount on your voucher, IF you 
have not sold the voucher in the auction, and if we do not take your voucher. 
 
Before we begin the auction, we want to be sure that you understand how your earnings are 
determined in this auction.  Please answer the following questions.  When you are done, raise 
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your hand and one of us will come by and check your answers. 
 
Start with your Voucher 1.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Now write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to 
calculate example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you 
wish.  Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Suppose that the average price paid in the auction was $1.00 (we’re using a number that is lower 
than anything that will be used in the auction; again, this is just an example) Use your voucher’s 
redemption value, your offer price for the voucher, and information about the average price paid 
in the auction to answer the following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 1 in the auction), and if 
we do not take the voucher involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?   
 
(b) If your offer for voucher 1 is not accepted, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1?  
 
( c ) If your offer for voucher 1 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1? 
 
Now look at your Voucher 2.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to calculate 
example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you wish.  
Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Suppose that the average price paid in the auction was $1.00 (we’re using a number that is lower 
than anything that will be used in the auction; again, this is just an example) Use your voucher’s 
redemption value, your offer price for the voucher, and information about the average price paid 
in the auction to answer the following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 2 in the auction), and if 
we do not take the voucher involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?   
 
(b) If your offer for Voucher 2 is not accepted, but we do take the voucher from you 
involuntarily, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2?  
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( c  ) If your offer for Voucher 2 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2? 
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A1.7 Experiment Instructions, Sealed Offer Auction with Announced 
Reservation Price, without taking 
 
 Welcome to our experiment.  Today, you will participate in an auction in which you will 
definitely earn money.  These instructions explain the rules of the auction and how your earnings 
will be determined. 
 
Earning Money In This Experiment 
 
 You have an envelope that contains two vouchers—the two pink slips in your envelope. 
Please look at your vouchers now.  Each voucher has a 4-digit identification number.  The first 
digit – number – identifies your voucher (you have two vouchers, which start with a 1 and a 2 
respectively). 
  
On each of your vouchers there is also a value with a dollar sign.  This is the 
redemption value of the voucher.  In other words, at the end of the auction, you can turn your 
voucher in to us and we will pay you this amount of money in cash.  Is that clear?  It is possible 
that your two vouchers have different values written on them, and also that others in the auction 
may have different values than you do.  However, each voucher may be turned in to us at the end 
of the auction for the amount of money written on the front of it.  We have enough cash with us 
to pay all of you for your vouchers. 
 
 However, you have a choice.  You can keep your voucher and cash it in at the end of the 
auction for the amount of money that is written on it.  OR, you may offer to sell one or both of 
your vouchers to us for some price.  We will call the price at which you offer to sell your 
voucher is your OFFER PRICE. 
 
 If we accept your offer to sell a voucher to us, you will receive your OFFER PRICE.  In this 
case, you will return the voucher to us in exchange for this offer price.  In other words, you will 
receive the offer price instead of the dollar amount of the voucher (the voucher’s redemption 
value). 
 
 If, on the other hand, we do not accept your offer to sell your voucher you will keep it 
and receive the REDEMPTION VALUE written on the voucher.  Thus, for each voucher, you will 
earn either (but not both): 
 
* the dollar amount on the voucher, if you have not sold it to us (whether or not you offered to 
sell it). 
OR 
*your OFFER PRICE if you have sold your voucher to us. 
 
How We Choose Which Offers to Accept 
 
 There are ________ people participating in today's auction, and each person has 2 
vouchers; therefore there are a total of ______ vouchers.  We have a target for the number of 
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vouchers that we want to purchase.  For this purpose, we don’t care anything about the voucher’s 
redemption value, or who owns the voucher: we just have a target for the number of vouchers 
that we want to acquire, and also a fixed amount of money for buying your vouchers (in addition 
to the money we will use to pay you for any vouchers we do not sell).  However, we cannot tell 
you either the voucher target or our budget available to buy vouchers. 
 
We also have a maximum price that we are willing to pay for vouchers. We will entertain all 
offers up to a maximum price of $19.40.  Lower offers will be accepted first, followed by 
progressively higher offers until we obtain our target number of vouchers.  Thus, low offers 
stand a greater chance of being accepted.  If there are more offers to sell vouchers at the 
maximum accepted price than required to meet our target, the following procedures will be 
employed: All offers below the maximum accepted price will definitely be accepted.  We will 
then obtain the additional vouchers required by randomly choosing among all offers at the 
maximum accepted price until we have met our target. 
 
For example, suppose that we are unable to obtain our target number of vouchers if we 
accepted only those offers at prices below $19.40; however if we accepted all offers at or below 
$19.40 we would exceed our voucher target.  In this case we would accept all offers below 
$19.40 and then randomly choose among the $19.40 offers until we meet our target.  In other 
words, all offers below $19.40 are accepted, but only some of those offers at $19.40 will be 
accepted. 
 
Of course, the maximum accepted price might be less than $19.40.  In this case, the same 
procedures would be followed:  all offers below the maximum accepted price would be accepted 
and then we would randomly choose among those at the maximum price until we meet our 
voucher target. 
 
Auction Procedures 
 
1.  Please look at your Offer Form, which is the last page attached to these instructions.  The 
top half of the form refers to your first voucher and the bottom refers to your second 
voucher.  If you wish to offer a voucher for sale, just write your offer price – the amount 
of money we would have to pay you for you to sell your voucher to us – in the space 
indicated for any voucher(s) you wish to sell.  If you do not wish to sell a voucher, write 
NS in the space indicated. 
 
2.  After you have made these decisions, bring your Offer Form to one of us in the lab.  
Remember: if we accept your offer, you will receive your offer price instead of the 
dollar amount written on the voucher.  If your offer is NOT accepted (or if you do not 
offer your voucher for sale) you will receive its redemption value. 
 
3. When we have all of your Offer Forms, we will enter all offers to sell vouchers.  We will 
order them from the lowest offer price to the highest offer price.   Starting with the lowest 
offer price, we will buy that voucher, then the voucher with the next lowest offer price, 
and continue buying vouchers with the lowest offer prices until either: (1) we’ve reached 
our target number of vouchers; or (2) we have exhausted our funds; whichever happens 
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first.  If, at the highest offer price that we can pay in a round, there is a “tie,” i.e., more 
than one voucher has been offered at the highest accepted price, we will randomly choose 
which offers to accept.  As we described above, in this case, all offers below this highest 
accepted price will be definitely accepted. 
 
4. We will then announce the voucher numbers for those vouchers that we have purchased.  
Each person whose offer was accepted will receive the offer price for any voucher(s) 
accepted.  All other vouchers will be exchanged for their redemption values. 
 
Summary 
 
Everyone has two vouchers.  You must decide for each voucher whether you wish to sell it (at a 
price at or below $19.40).  If you want to sell it, write your offer price in the appropriate part of 
your offer form.  If you do not want to sell it, write NS on your offer form.  When you’ve made 
your decisions for both vouchers, bring your offer form to us in the lab. 
 
Thus, you will receive one of the following amounts of money for each of your two 
vouchers. 
 
 Your offer price if your offer price is accepted and we buy your voucher from 
you. 
 
OR 
 
 The voucher’s redemption value, the dollar amount on your voucher, IF you 
have not sold the voucher in the auction. 
 
Before we begin the auction, we want to be sure that you understand how your earnings are 
determined in this auction.  Please answer the following questions.  When you are done, raise 
your hand and one of us will come by and check your answers. 
 
Start with your Voucher 1.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Now write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to 
calculate example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you 
wish.  Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 1: ________________    
 
Use your voucher’s redemption value and your offer price for the voucher to answer the 
following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 1 in the auction), how 
much would you be paid for Voucher 1?   
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(b) If your offer for voucher 1 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 1? 
 
Now look at your Voucher 2.  Write the redemption value for this voucher in the space below: 
 
 Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Write an offer price in the space below.  You will use this offer price in order to calculate 
example earnings.  In the actual auction you may choose a different offer price if you wish.  
Nothing in this example will have any effect on your earnings. 
 
 Your offer price for Voucher 2: ________________    
 
Use your voucher’s redemption value and your offer price for the voucher to answer the 
following questions. 
 
(a) If your offer price is not accepted (that is, if you don't sell Voucher 2 in the auction), how 
much would you be paid for Voucher 2?   
 
(b) If your offer for Voucher 2 is accepted, how much would you be paid for Voucher 2? 
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A2.1 Values Used in Experiments 
 
Pilot Experiments 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 11 
2 4 10 
3 5 9 
4 6 8 
5 7 7 
6 8 6 
7 9 5 
8 10 4 
9 11 3 
10 3 11 
11 4 10 
12 5 9 
13 6 8 
14 7 7 
15 8 6 
16 9 5 
17 10 4 
18 11 3 
19 3 11 
20 4 10 
21 5 9 
22 6 8 
23 7 7 
24 8 6 
25 9 5 
26 10 4 
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September 24, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
14 6 7 
15 8 9 
 
 
September 26, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
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October 3, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
 
 
October 8, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
14 6 7 
15 8 9 
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October 10, 2001 (Session 1) 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
 
 
October 10, 2001 (Session 2) 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
14 6 7 
15 8 9 
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November 5, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
14 6 7 
15 8 9 
 
 
November 7, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
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November 8, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 3 4 
2 3 4 
3 5 5 
4 6 7 
5 6 7 
6 8 9 
7 8 9 
8 10 11 
9 10 11 
10 4 5 
11 6 7 
12 8 9 
13 10 11 
 
 
December 3, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
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December 4, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
 
 
December 5, 2001 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
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December 7, 2001 (Session 1) 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
 
 
December 7, 2001 (Session 2) 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
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February 28, 2002 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
 
 
April 4, 2002 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
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April 8, 2002 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
 
 
April 24, 2002 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
15 20 21 
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April 25, 2002 
Subject ID Voucher 1 Voucher 2 
1 15 16 
2 22 23 
3 18 19 
4 20 21 
5 17 17 
6 22 23 
7 18 19 
8 20 21 
9 16 17 
10 20 21 
11 18 19 
12 15 16 
13 22 23 
14 18 19 
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A3.1 Surveys 
 
Survey: Farmers with Accepted Offers in 2002 Irrigation Auction 
To: Southwest Georgia Farmer 
 
From: Researchers at the Georgia Water Policy and Planning Center 
 
Thank you for taking the time required to complete this short questionnaire.  Your responses will 
be treated confidentially.  No one will be able to associate a completed questionnaire with the 
person that completed it.  Your responses will help us a great deal in our research focused on 
means by which the management of water resources in Southwest Georgia can be improved. 
 
The questions given below apply to the land covered by permit # 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Our initial questions refer to last year’s (2001) planting season. 
 
1. Did you plant on this land last year?  Yes ______   No ______ (If no, skip to 3) 
 
2. What crops (acreage of each crop and irrigation water use) did you plant? 
 
 Irr. Water use 
        Crop                            Acreage               (inches)                               
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
B.  The following questions refer to the current (2002) planting season. 
 
3. Have you already planted on this land this season?  Yes ______ No ______  
 
If Yes, what crops (and acreage in each crop) have you planted?  
  
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
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4. If your offer in the EPD’s acreage reduction auction had NOT been accepted, would you 
have planted on this land? 
Yes ________  No _______  
 
 
If Yes, what would you have planted? 
 
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
5. Do you intend to plant on this land this year even though you cannot irrigate? 
Yes _______  No ________ 
 
 
C.    Our final questions relate to your experience in the EPD’s acreage reduction auction. 
 
      6.  What factors did you considered in setting an offer price?   
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
      7.  Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than 
last year’s?   Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be improved?  
Your comments: 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
      8.  Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50% cost-share by the state? Yes___  No ____ 
 
Comments: (under what conditions would you agree to the above?) 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR HELP 
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Survey: Farmers with Rejected Offers in 2002 Irrigation Auction 
To: Southwest Georgia Farmer 
 
From: Researchers at the Georgia Water Policy and Planning Center 
 
Thank you for taking the time required to complete this short questionnaire.  Your responses will 
be treated confidentially.  No one will be able to associate a completed questionnaire with the 
person that completed it.  Your responses will help us a great deal in our research focused on 
means by which the management of water resources in Southwest Georgia can be improved. 
 
The questions given below apply to the land covered by permit # 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Our initial questions refer to last year’s (2001) planting season. 
 
1. Did you plant on this land last year?  Yes ______   No ______ (If no, skip to 3) 
 
2. What crops (acreage of each crop and irrigation water use) did you plant? 
 
 Irr. Water use 
        Crop                            Acreage               (inches)                               
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
B.  The following questions refer to the current (2002) planting season. 
 
3. Have you already planted on this land this season?  Yes ______ No ______  
 
If Yes, what crops (and acreage in each crop) have you planted?  
  
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
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4. If you have not already planted on this land, do you intend to plant on this land this year? 
Yes ________  No _______  
 
If Yes, what will you plant? 
 
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
5. If your offer in the EPD’s acreage reduction auction HAD been accepted, would you 
have planted on this land even though you wouldn’t have been able to irrigate? 
Yes ________  No _______  
 
 
C.    Our final questions relate to your experience in the EPD’s acreage reduction auction. 
 
      6.  What factors did you considered in setting an offer price?   
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
      7.  Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than 
last year’s?   Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be improved?  
Your comments: 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
      8.  Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50% cost-share by the state? Yes___ No ____ 
 
Comments: (under what conditions would you agree to the above?) 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR HELP 
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Survey: Farmers who Did Not Participate in 2002 Irrigation Auction 
To: Southwest Georgia Farmer 
 
From: Researchers at the Georgia Water Policy and Planning Center 
 
Thank you for taking the time required to complete this short questionnaire.  Your responses will 
be treated confidentially.  No one will be able to associate a completed questionnaire with the 
person that completed it.  Your responses will help us a great deal in our research focused on 
means by which the management of water resources in Southwest Georgia can be improved. 
 
The questions given below apply to the land covered by permit # 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Our initial questions refer to last year’s (2001) planting season. 
 
1. Did you plant on this land last year?  Yes ______   No ______ (If no, skip to 3) 
 
2. What crops (acreage of each crop and irrigation water use) did you plant? 
 
 Irr. Water use 
        Crop                            Acreage               (inches)                               
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
B.  The following questions refer to the current (2002) planting season. 
 
3. Have you already planted on this land this season?  Yes ______ No ______  
 
If Yes, what crops (and acreage in each crop) have you planted?  
  
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
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4. If you have not already planted on this land, do you intend to plant on this land this year? 
Yes ________  No _______  
 
If Yes, what will you plant? 
 
        Crop                          Acreage       Date Planted? 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
___________  ________________  ________________ 
 
 
C.    Our final questions relate to your experience in the EPD’s acreage reduction auction. 
 
5. If the EPD’s acreage reduction auction had accepted offers above $150/acre, would you 
have participated in the auction?  ___ Yes  ___ No 
 
If Yes, what would have been the minimum offer price at which you would have 
participated?  $ _______ 
 
6. Were there factors other than the EPD’s upper limit on an offer price that influenced your 
decision to not participate?  If so,  would you share those with us? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than 
last year’s?   Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be 
improved?  Your comments: 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
      8.  Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50% cost-share by the state?   __ Yes  __ No 
 
Comments: (under what conditions would you agree to the above?) 
______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANKS AGAIN FOR YOUR HELP 
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A3.2 Transcript of Comments: Factors Affecting Offer Price/Participation 
 
Question for Those with Accepted Offers: 
“What factors did you consider in setting an offer price?” 
 
• Yield and quality of crops grown without waste, plus the possibility of a near zero crop 
yield 
• Crops grown and commodity prices 
• Low cotton price 
• - 
• - 
• What crop the rotation called for; what profit on a normal year could be expected and 
what payments were expected off this land 
• Possible profit 
• Irrigation’s economic return 
• Price offered per acre,  crop planted 
• The amount of money I would lose by not irrigating 
• An average of the prior year’s payment per acre 
• Low enough to be accepted, should have bid more 
• Irrigation’s economic return 
• - 
• The potential value of the crop if irrigated versus the value of dry land crops 
• Could not afford to go any lower on bid 
• Average land/peanut rent prices 
• Help conserve water usage 
• Average land rent 
• Uncertainty about the new farm bill with questions on commodity prices.  However, if the 
present farm bill would have been implemented on a timely basis, then the $150 cap 
would have kept us from participating. 
• I tried to get accepted 
• - 
• Made sure I got in 
• Peanuts and cotton are both my expensive crops to grow 
• - 
• What cost would have been to maintain irrigation equipment. 
• As close to $150/acre as possible, that’s what my land rents for. 
• - 
• Since we had cancelled our farm rental agreement for 2002, we wanted at least as much 
as we would have gotten from the farm rent 
• Difference in tonnage of peanuts or cotton or corn, with or without water 
• I bid what I thought would be accepted 
•  Uncertainty of the new farm bill with questions of commodity prices led to our decision.  
However, if the present form of the discussed farm bill had been implemented on a timely 
basis, then the $150.00 cap would not have been enough for us to participate. 
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• Uncertainty of the new farm bill with questions of commodity prices led to our decision.  
However, if the present form of the discussed farm bill had been implemented on a timely 
basis, then the $150.00 ceiling placed on the auction would not have been enough money 
per acre for us to have participated in the auction. 
• Uncertainty of the new farm bill with questions of commodity prices led to our decision.  
However, if the present form of the discussed farm bill had been implemented on a timely 
basis, then the $150.00 cap would have been insufficient. 
• Knowing what I needed to at least break even by not irrigating 
• - 
• Better than farming   
• Comparison with the price of irrigated rent; drought 
• I think it is a fair price 
• Value of irrigation to crops, cost of replacing lost crop if no production and cash flow 
requirements of total farms 
• To insure cost of production from insurance and bid price 
•  - 
• What I could live with 
• Value to me 
• Cost of production and yield, irrigated and non-irrigated potential payment from acreage 
reduction auction 
• Cost, prices and farm program 
• Irrigation equipment payment and interest; rising fuel cost; water availability; insurance 
guarantee (dry vs. irrigated) and operational loan repayment 
• - 
• Environmental impact; pleasure in having flowing stream and quality of land 
• Environmental impact; pleasure in having flowing stream and quality of land 
• Environmental impact; pleasure in having flowing stream and quality of land 
• Amount I would lose by not irrigating 
• Current personal obligations and expenses 
• Prices and supply of water 
• Crop prices and water supply 
• Prices and water supply 
• Yield reduction; cost reduction; and equipment cost 
• Yield reduction; land value (equipment cost) and cost reduction 
• If price is high enough to offset loss of irrigation, reduce my risk when prices of 
commodities are as low as they are now. 
• - 
• - 
• The low price of cotton 
• Potential profit related to irrigated acreage vs. un-irrigated acreage 
• Discussions with other farmers and then made a decision 
• Target price and availability of water 
• Cost of production and return 
• Submitting a reasonable bid and being able to plant it or rent it out   
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Question for Those with Rejected Offers: 
“What factors did you consider in setting an offer price?” 
 
• Crops to be grown 
• Rent 
• My income out of the acreage vs. payment 
• What I thought it would cost me if I did not irrigate, in lost yields and quality 
• Their letter for maximum bid 
• Their letter for maximum bid 
• I had cover crop that might have been cut for grain to add to income 
• Dollar return needed on land 
• Land rental is $150. No wear and tear on pivots or pumping unit. 
• Land rental is $150. No wear and tear on pivots or pumping unit. 
• Dollar return needed on land 
• Last year’s average in everyone’s offer 
• Dollar return needed on land 
• Dollar return needed on land 
• Value to me 
• - 
• Production cost, commodity price 
• - 
• (Partly) the difference that could be made between watered and not watered cotton. 
• Price received 
• The price I received and if it would be less risk and more profit or at least as much profit 
Dollar return needed on land 
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Question for Those who Did Not Participate: 
“Were there factors other than the EPD’s upper limit on an offer price that influenced your 
decision not to participate? If so, would you share those with us?” 
 
 
• My offer price for this year’s auction was determined by the fact that lack of irrigation 
cuts the yield of most crops by half during a drought.  I had to justify how much I needed 
to make per acre to justify the loss in yield. 
• - 
• - 
• All crop land is leased out 
• I prefer to have the crops 
• Muscadine vines are a long term investment and we must constantly keep the vine healthy 
or lose production in the following year or lose the vine entirely 
• To not irrigate the corn and hay in a dry year could result in poor quality silage and hay.  
Our feed shortage that could cost more in milk production then is gained by not 
irrigating. 
• Potentially, I can generate about $10,000 per acre 
• - 
• Yes. This is the best land and some of the biggest fields we own are also the easiest and 
cheapest to irrigate 
• Rotation of crops 
• Yes, I have equipment and labor and overhead to cover on a set number of irrigated 
acres; I do not want dry land. 
• - 
• No 
• No 
• We have redundant systems surface and well water.  We would consider selling one 
source but not at the expense of voiding the other source. 
• We have redundant systems surface and well water.  We would consider selling one 
source but not at the expense of voiding the other source. 
• - 
• Insurance 
• Could not grow turf without water 
• Due to our set-up and crop rotations, it is impossible for us to shut down one pump 
completely. We could leave some acreage out. 
• - 
• - 
• No 
• Auction time conflict with crop insurance - cover two crop season - fall seeded and 
spring seeded.  Limitation on bids should be by acres and not by permit number 
• We did not qualify - according to EPD’s maps 
• We can’t let our peanuts burn up for $150.00 per acre.  There were more acres we could 
have idled but they were all under one pumping station 
• - 
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• - 
• Can not compete with high yielding crops 
• We are farming for a profit. We think that we can make more farming our land 
• I need to irrigate our crops 
• I have to feed my cows all year, $150.00/acre would not do this 
• I have to feed my cows all year, $150.00/acre would not do this 
• Had rented land by the time EPD made their determination 
• - 
• I have a permitted well that also irrigates the same acreage as this surface permit. I had 
rather farm and try to make some crop than not 
• Banker wanted crops irrigated in order to finance 
• We grow feed for dairy, replacement cattle and beef 
• Insurance on dry land is combined with irrigation crops, irrigation yields would cancel 
out dry land losses 
• - 
• Yes, this permit is watered by Circle while the other is run by Traveler 
• - 
• - 
• - 
• $150.00 not high enough to cover costs and risk of not watering 
• No longer farming 
• $150.00 was not sufficient to cover cost and risk of not watering 
• I have two separate systems on this one permit which keeps me from offering a part of it 
for a bid and then plant crop on the other half. 
• - 
• - 
• The corn I grow is needed for dairy cow feed 
• - 
• Yes, research needs 
• No, this land had not been planted in a couple of years and it was the year to plant 
peanuts 
• Did not irrigate, so I was not entitled to participate 
• Rather have the use for irrigation 
• Yes, research needs 
• - 
• - 
• No 
• My decision not to participate was that I did not want to let my watermelons and 
cantelope land go.  They told me its all or nothing.  
• Permit had not been used in the last three years. An unfair barometer used for auction 
acreage. 
• Land had not been irrigated in last three years 
• - 
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• I am co-owner of a farm supply business, peanut buying point and cotton gin, if I do not 
plant, then each of these businesses would suffer.  Furthermore, the water supply is 
abundant which helps to insure a good crop 
• - 
• We are in the pine seedling business. A one year loss of growth to our customers can 
never be replaced. This loss would result in a harvest rotation differential that would 
cause significant financial loss to the forest landowner.
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A3.3 Transcript of Comments: Comparison of 2001/2002 Auctions 
 
Question for Those with Accepted Offers: 
“Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than last 
year’s? Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be improved?” 
 
• This year was somewhat better 
• I prefer this year’s method 
• Somewhat better 
• Better 
• Better 
• Better 
• Better than last year, should be held in February 
• Better 
• Worse, go back to last year’s auction 
• Better 
• Better, establish a price per acre -  no bidding 
• Better 
• Better 
• - 
• I would prefer the 2001 auction method over the 2002 method, but  I would like to 
have a limit on the number of rounds that would take place and know in advance the 
number of rounds 
• Better than last year 
• Better 
• Worse, got papers every week for 4 weeks 
• Better 
• This year’s method was better, however, in a normal year the $150 cap would have 
kept us from participating 
• I did not participate last year 
• Better 
• Better 
• I think it was a lot better than last year’s 
• About the same.  Price per acre should be a fixed amount ($175.00) and the auction 
should be held in January so that we can make better plans 
• About the same. The date of auction needs to be in January so we can make plans.  
Price needs to be a fixed amount ($175.00) for every acre. Need to make sure acres 
taken are really irrigated. Do not pay for acres that would not be irrigated. 
• Did not apply last year, so can not comment 
• - 
• It was better in 2002, because it involved the owners directly without the renters 
getting involved. Last year our farmer was able to steal the auction money from us 
• Better and more simple 
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• I had surgery last year and could not participate. If it had been like this year (through 
the mail) I probably would have. 
• This year’s format was much better- however, as stated above, in a normal year the 
$150 cap would have been insufficient 
• We liked this year’s sealed bids better – however in a normal year, I would not have 
liked the $150.00 per acre cap 
• This year was better, however,  with the new farm bill implemented, the $150.00 cap 
could have kept us from participating 
• Better, because farmers know what they need not to irrigate 
• - 
• It was okay, but they were very slow in responding to anything 
• N/A 
• Better 
• Better. This year was better and more equitable than last year’s: there should be no 
restrictions on permits used on pasture; and pray for rain so we don’t need to irrigate 
or have an auction 
• Better 
• - 
• Better 
• Worse, last year’s was better – even though mine was not accepted 
• Better 
• Better 
• Worse. Mail delivery not reliable or speedy; slow response by DNR 
• Better 
• Better this year 
• Better this year 
• Better this year 
• Do not know.  Was not in the auction last year 
• N/A 
• Better, last year’s was terrible 
• Better, last year’s was terrible 
• Better, last year’s was terrible 
• Better. I suggest an earlier starting date to allow farmers to make planting and 
planning decisions at the time crop loans are applied for. This will eliminate changes 
in projections. One mail out should request all needed information, whereas we 
received three 
• Better.  Let one mail out contain all needed information, get an early start as most 
farmers make decisions and projections before late March.  
• Both have advantages and disadvantages to bidders 
• Better this year 
• Better this year 
• Yes, price is way too low when cotton prices get better 
• Better than last year   
• A lot better 
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• Better 
• The producer and not the landlord, should be the one doing this bidding 
• I think the acres of land irrigated should be accurate.  I know in my case it was not, I 
had 31 acres more.  Some of my friends had auctioned for much more, I am sure the 
permitted acres are not accurate.  I feel this should be cancelled.  
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Question for Those with Rejected Offers: 
“Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than last 
year’s? Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be improved?” 
 
• I don’t agree with either process. A price should be set to pay and any grower willing to 
participate at that price should be accepted. 
• Either way – what’s missing is some of the acreage that was bid and accepted was not 
intended to be irrigated, so the money spent did not conserve any water.  This needs to be 
checked on, that is why they could bid less.   
• I was not asked to participate last year (2001) 
• This year was better 
• Better 
• Better 
• Yes. Cable tow should be cheaper than pivot. 
• Better 
• Worse. Give us a second chance to bid. 
• Worse. Give us a second chance to bid. 
• Better. 
• Better. Less time consuming on my plot, was disappointed that my offer was not accepted. 
• Better 
• Better 
• Worse 
• Better. Set offer price, take it or leave it. Buy in surface permits and with exchange for deep 
well at owner’s location choice.   
• Ok 
• Same 
• I did not get my bidding material until the 14th March and the bid was to be in the Atlanta 
office the 15th of March – impossible. 
• Same 
• - 
• Better 
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Question for Those who Did Not Participate: 
“Do you consider the way that this year’s auction was carried out was better or worse than last 
year’s? Do you have suggestions for ways by which the auction process can be improved?” 
 
• The way the auction was carried out this year was, by far, better than the process of 2001 
• - 
• Better, upper limits to compete with a high yielding farmer 
• - 
• Better this year, better organized 
•  - 
• Unknown 
• Didn’t participate 
• None 
• Yes, definitely better 
• Better, more organized this year 
• Better 
• - 
• Better 
• Better 
• Take your money and buy water from the most active and/or destructive irrigation 
systems. 
• Take your money and buy water from the most active and/or destructive irrigation 
systems. 
• Better 
• I did not get the offer till late 
• Better 
• - 
• - 
• - 
• Better 
• Impossible to worse than last year.  Pay more and buy more water, not a bunch of 
systems that are not efficient enough to be used and therefore do not consume much 
water. 
• Better 
• Better 
• - 
• - 
• - 
• Yes. You should have higher limits for pivots 
• - 
• Do not know 
• Do not know 
• Better 
• - 
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• - 
• Liked this year better in some ways but last year was more of an auction 
• No comment 
• Better 
• - 
• Yes, because farmers know what they must get not to irrigate.   
• - 
• None 
• - 
• Better 
• Better 
• Better 
• Same 
• Better 
• - 
• - 
• - 
• Did not participate, so unable to comment 
• Better. My bid information was received on March 14th and the bid was to be in the office 
March 15th , impossible. 
• No comment other than that I think people have taken advantage of it.  Greed. 
• Had not participated in auction 
• Did not participate, so unable to comment 
• - 
• - 
• N/A 
• I think you should put a meter on the pumps and let a person decide which part to plant 
or not plant any part of the permit..   
• Make all peanuts eligible – we have not pumped in the past to try and conserve blue line 
streams  
• - 
• - 
• I think it is better organized and much easier and less time consuming than the auction 
last year 
• Better 
• Send out an initial postcard requesting yes/no for participation. A YES response would 
require an auction packet and a NO would save time, money and auction material 
• Better than last year 
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A3.4 Transcript of Comments: Willingness to Install a Meter 
 
Question for Those with Accepted Offers: 
“Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50 percent cost-share by the state?  Under what conditions would 
you agree to the above?” 
 
• No. I would if State paid 100% of cost 
• Yes 
• No. State pays all 
• Does not know 
• Not sure 
• Possibly. I am not sure of what 50% cost-share by the State means. 
• - 
• Needs more information 
• No. Pumps not permanent, travelers used, multiple farms 
• No. It should be no cost to me 
• Yes 
• No. Let ASCS office handle regulations 
• Needs more information 
• No 
• No. I would agree for the meter if the State pays for 100% of the cost 
• No 
• Would need better explanation of criteria before deciding 
• Yes. I would be present each time it was read 
• No 
• No. 100% cost to the State 
• Yes 
• Not sure 
• Not sure 
• No. I would like to know more about it 
• No 
• No 
• Needs more information to make a decision 
• - 
• Yes.  If we could be sure of obtaining some money from the Sate by this means 
• No 
• - 
• No (100% cost to the State) 
• No (100% cost to the State) 
• No (100% cost to the State) 
• No (I might/would agree if state paid 100% of cost) 
• - 
• Yes 
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• No 
• No  
• No. My experience with meters has not been good. They are expensive and unreliable. 
They are only slightly better than a SWAG. I do not have a problem with metering if a 
reliable meter is available. (The EPD bears the total cost of the meter and installation as 
well as replacement, and the program is voluntary – not mandated). 
• No (only if state paid all cost) 
• I would need to know more about the program 
• I think this is giving to government too much control. 
• No (100% cost share) 
• No 
• No (EPD or State should bear the cost) 
• No (not sure about this, need further discussion) 
• No 
• Doesn’t know 
• Doesn’t know 
• Doesn’t know 
• Do not understand the question. 50% of what, the cost of irrigation or cost of the meter? 
• Yes (if the cost share was based on actual costs that were obtained, e.g., fuel prices)  
• No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
• Yes, but I would rather not. 
• No 
• No 
• No (would not agree under any circumstances) 
• No, under no conditions 
• No, I would need to know more about it 
• Undecided 
• No. Need to deal with the actual farmer. 
• Yes (provided everyone had to follow the same rules) 
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Question for Those with Rejected Offers: 
“Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50 percent cost-share by the state?  Under what conditions would 
you agree to the above?” 
 
• No 
• Yes. I rent it as irrigated [and intend to irrigate it unless compensated, if I accept money for 
not irrigating, I won’t].  You can put any devise on it. 
• Maybe. I don’t know the cost, so I will not agree or disagree without that knowledge. 
• No. Cost share needs to be 75% to 100% by State 
• Yes 
• Yes 
• No 
• No (100%) 
• No 
• No 
• No. 100% cost share 
• No. I think if there is abundant supply, it is not going to hurt the water supply 
• No. (100%) 
• No. (100% cost share) 
• No. ( 100% EPD pay) 
• No  
• No 
• Yes 
• No.  I use my pumping unit at more than one place, they are mobile 
• Yes, but rather not 
• Yes, but would rather not, because of cost and see little benefit to me or government. 
• No (100%) 
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Question for Those who Did Not Participate: 
“Would you agree to have a sealed meter on your pumps, read annually by the EPD, under 
conditions where there was a 50 percent cost-share by the state?  Under what conditions would 
you agree to the above?” 
 
• No. As I understand this program, the water I pump for 2002 would be measured, then I 
would be offered a cost-share the following year for not pumping over the amount 
pumped the year before.  This is ridiculous because once the crop is in the ground, the 
farmer has made the commitment to see it through and can not restrict water in the 
middle of the growing season. 
• No, never 
• - 
• - 
• No, provided that all pumps in the State have meters, including those of government and 
industry. 
• No 
• Unknown.  No restricted water usage. 
• No. I do not know that I could. 
• No 
• Yes 
• Possibly, depends on cost involved. 
• Yes 
• - 
• Need more information before answer 
• Need more information 
• No.  Permits were given with the understanding that older permits would have priority 
over newer permits – that is apparently not the case.  Who knows where, when or how 
this information would be used, and whether it would help or hinder your farm. 
• No.  Permits were given with the understanding that older permits would have priority 
over newer permits – that is apparently not the case.  Who knows where, when or how 
this information would be used, and whether it would help or hinder your farm 
(photocopy). 
• No. At no cost to me. 
• Yes 
• No. Let local ASCS handle water regulations. 
• Yes. As long as it would not be used in the future for allocations. 
• - 
• - 
• Yes 
• No. No cost, no inconvenience and removable if requested by landowner. 
• No 
• No 
• - 
• This permit was for rented land - I no longer rent the land covered by this permit. 
• - 
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• - 
• No. If they paid all and kept it repaired. 
• - 
• No. Would not cost me anything 
• No. Would not cost me anything 
• No. 100% cost share, voluntarily – data would have to be transmitted wireless 
(telephone), you would not have unknown people on your farm. 
• - 
• No 
• Wants to know a lot more about it 
• No. If it were mandated by law. Since our lakes cause springs below, there is more water 
running in the streams below dams, than would if there were no dams, during the dry 
periods of Summer and Fall. Otherwise the dams are overflowing. 
• - 
• - 
• No. I might if State paid 100% of cost. 
• - 
• No (only at 100%) 
• No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
• Not enough information. To start (agree); i) state pays the full cost, ii) this information 
would not be used in a harmful way to the farmer in the future, which some of the rules 
have been done on the water auction.  We were all assured in 1988 this would not happen 
when we all had to sign up on our irrigation land. 
• Do not know 
• Needs to replace system 
• - 
• - 
• No (mandatory) 
• No. My pumps are mobile and I use them at different places.  
• No. Would not like this at all, tired of being regulated by the Government, it should be an 
honor system. 
• No 
• No (mandatory) 
• - 
• No 
• No 
• Yes, but first needs to know the cost involved. 
• No 
• No 
• - 
• No. Would agree if State pays 100% of cost. 
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• Needs more information 
• Not sure what 50% cost share means. We already have meters on our pumps. 
• No 
 
 
